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Summary 
The emergence of Big Data presents the EU legislator with new challenges 
of how to protect EU citizens’ fundamental right to privacy as the Internet 
allows for massive amounts of personal data to easily cross borders. To 
meet the new challenges created by the borderless Internet, new privacy 
legislation is on its way in order to provide EU citizens with an adequate 
and sufficient protection for their fundamental right to privacy. The EU 
privacy protection provides its citizens with a broad protection for their 
fundamental right to privacy and personal data. This is considered as a 
general principle in EU law. In contrast, the U.S. does not have any 
comprehensive unanimous data protection laws. Rather it has chosen a 
sectorial approach, which renders data protection decentralized, fragmented, 
industry-specific, and largely uncoordinated among varying levels of 
government. This discrepancy between the EU and the U.S. presents 
challenges for a uniform international privacy standard that can facilitate for 
transatlantic transfers of personal data. 
 
In the Schrems ruling, the Court of Justice of the European Union held that 
an adequacy decision under article 41 requires an investigation of the 
privacy protection offered by a third country. In addition, the Court 
concluded that the protection in the third country must offer a privacy 
protection that is “essentially equivalent” to the EU privacy protection. In 
the case, the Court invalidated the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor Program and 
concluded that the U.S. legal order did not amount to a privacy protection 
that is “essentially equivalent”. The Schrems ruling has left EU and U.S. 
companies that transfer EU citizens’ personal data to the U.S. with few 
lawful instruments for such transfers. Moreover, the discrepancy between 
the two privacy regimes will make it difficult to negotiate a Safe Harbor 2.0, 
especially because the U.S. does not recognize the right to erasure, which is 
a key provision in the EU privacy protection. 
 
The emergence of Big Data, the discrepancy between the EU and the U.S. 
privacy protection, the Schrems ruling, and the proposed GDPR have 
resulted in challenges for both legislators and companies with regard to 
transatlantic transfers of personal data. I contend in this thesis that the U.S. 
legal order does not amount to a protection that is “essentially equivalent” to 
the EU privacy protection. However, the discprepancy cannot result in a 
suspension of transatlantic transfers of personal data. Therefore, a 
reasonable compromise would be that EU citizens are provided with 
actionable privacy rights and a workable enforcement in a Safe Harbor 2.0. 
Consequently, regardless whether or not the data cross borders, EU citizens’ 
fundamental right to privacy is an offline right that also need to apply 
online. 
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Sammanfattning 
Framväxten av ”Big Data” har ställt EU:s lagstiftare inför nya utmaningar 
avseende skyddet för EU-medborgarnas grundläggande rätt till privatliv och 
personuppgifter. Detta då internet har medfört att enorma mängder av 
personuppgifter numera utan svårigheter kan överföras över landsgränser. 
Mot bakgrund av de utmaningar som följer av det gränslösa internet är ny 
EU-lagstiftning är på väg. Denna syftar till att ge EU-medborgare ett 
fullgott och adekvat skydd för deras grundläggande rätt till privatliv och 
personuppgifter. Vidare ger EU-rätten ett brett skydd för EU-medborgares 
rätt till privatliv och personuppgifter. En rätt som även anses utgöra en 
allmän princip i EU-rätten. I motsats till EU:s syn på rätten till privatlivet 
har USA ingen övergripande, enhetlig dataskyddslagstiftning. Istället har 
USA valt ett sektoriellt förhållningssätt. Detta resulterar i att det 
amerikanska dataskyddet är decentraliserat, fragmenterat, industri-specifikt 
och i det stora hela okoordinerat för olika myndighetsnivåer. Diskrepansen 
mellan EU och USA visar tydligt på de utmaningar som finns i utformandet 
av en internationell enhetlig standard för skyddet till privatliv.  
 
I Schrems-domen fastslog Europeiska unionens domstol att bedömningen av 
en adekvat skyddsnivå i enlighet med artikel 41 kräver en undersökning av 
det integritetsskydd som erbjuds i det tredje landet. Därutöver konstaterade 
domstolen att skyddet i tredje land måste erbjuda ett integritetsskydd som "i 
huvudsak motsvarar" EU:s integritetsskydd. I fallet, ogiltigförklarade 
domstolen EU-U.S. Safe Harbor-programmet och ansåg att den amerikanska 
rättsordningen inte uppnådde denna nivå. Schrems-domen har medfört att 
europeiska och amerikanska företag som överför EU-medborgarnas 
personuppgifter till USA har få lagliga medel för sådana överföringar. 
Skillnaderna mellan de två rättssystemen gör det svårt att förhandla fram en 
Safe Harbor 2.0. Detta särskilt då USA inte erkänner rätten att bli glömd, 
vilken är en viktig bestämmelse i EU:s integritetsskydd.   
 
Framväxten av ”Big Data”, skillnaderna mellan EU:s och USA:s skydd för 
privatliv och personuppgifter, Schrems-domen och den föreslagna GDPR 
har resulterat i utmaningar för både lagstiftare och företag när det gäller 
transatlantiska överföringar av personuppgifter. I uppsatsen hävdas att den 
amerikanska rättsordningen inte uppnår en skyddsnivå som "i huvudsak 
motsvarar" EU:s grundläggande skydd för privatliv och personuppgifter. 
Det är dock inte rimligt att diskrepansen ska leda till ett upphörande av 
transatlantiska överföringar av personuppgifter. Därför är en rimlig 
kompromiss att EU-medborgare förses med effektiva och angripbara 
rättigheter. Därutöver ska en fungerande tillsyn av rättigheterna garanteras i 
en Safe Harbor 2.0. Därför, oavsett om personuppgifter korsar landsgränser, 
är EU-medborgarnas grundläggande rätt till privatliv en rättighet offline 
som även måste gälla online.  
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of this thesis. I am very grateful for the time he has been willing to set aside 
to discuss this subject. I also want to thank professor Michael Rustad at 
Suffolk University Law School, who inspired me to learn more about this 
subject. He has been a great inspiration in this particular subject and has 
helped me gain a better comparative perspective of the U.S. and the EU 
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and support (and print copies of my thesis for me), and Lejla and Ulrica – 
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Abbreviations 
AEPD  Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
 
the Charter  the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the 
  European Union 
 
CISA  the Cybersecurity and Information Sharing Act 
  of 2015 
 
CJEU  the Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
the Directive  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament 
  and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
  protection of individuals with regard to the 
  processing of personal data and on the free 
  movement of such data 
 
DPA  Data Protection Authority 
 
ECHR  the European Convention for the Protection of 
  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
 
FTC   Federal Trade Commission 
 
GDPR  Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE  
   EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
  COUNCIL on the protection of individuals with 
  regard to the processing of personal data and on 
  the free movement of such data (General Data 
  Protection Regulation) 
 
Google Spain v. AEPD  Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia 
  Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja 
  González  
 
NSA  the National Security Agency 
 
OECD  the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
  and Development 
 
Section 230 of the CDA Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
 
SNS  Social Networking Site 
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the Principles the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and  
  Frequently Asked Questions 
 
the Safe Harbor U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Program 
 
WP29  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 
 
U.S.  United States 
 
U.S.C.   United States Code 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
So, why are the angry birds really angry? Vice-President of the European 
Commission, Vivane Reding, says it is because applications (and Social 
Networking Sites “SNS”) provide their services on a “take-it-or-leave-it” 
basis. 1 Due to the take-it-or-leave-it rule, the birds are angry because that is 
when trust evaporates and people feel forced to part with their privacy.2 An 
issue with the take-it-or-leave-it method is that users may not understand the 
extent of their given consent or, users do understand and disagree but do not 
possess the power to act. Snapchat, Instagram, and Facebook have grown to 
become popular SNS that all provide their services on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis.3 Although use is optional, the number of users of SNS is increasing, 
which indicates that use, in fact, may not be optional.  
 
Another reason for them being angry could also be that SNS are obscure and 
deceitful regarding how they use personal data. For example, in 2014, the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) alleged that Snapchat was deceiving 
consumers by a misrepresentation of its data collection practices.4 The FTC 
complaint alleged a misrepresentation of Snapchat’s practices with regard to 
the privacy, security, and confidentiality of users’ information.5 Even 
though Snapchat represented that it would not ask for, track, or access any 
location-specific information, it had integrated an analytics tracking service 
by which it collected users’ location information.6 Pursuant to the FTC 
complaint, the FTC and Snapchat settled the charges in a settlement 
agreement under which Snapchat is prohibited from misrepresenting the 
extent to which it maintains the privacy, security, or confidentiality of users’ 
                                                
1 Viviane Reding, A Data Protection Compact for Europe, 28 January 2014, 
2 Id. 
3 See Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, 25 November 2015, ”By using or 
accessing the Facebook Services, you agree to this Statement”, 
https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms; Instagram, Terms of Use, 19 January 2013, ”If you 
do not agree to be bound by all of these Terms of Use, do not access or use the Service”, 
https://instagram.com/about/legal/terms/; Snapchat, Terms of Service, 28 October 2015, 
”By using the Services, you agree to the Terms. Of course, if you don’t agree with them, 
then don’t use the Services.” 
4 Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Snapchat, Inc., a corporation, docket no. 132 
3078, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140508snapchatcmpt.pdf 
[hereinafter: In the Matter of Snapchat, Inc., a corporation], at paras 6-8. 
5 In the Matter of Snapchat, Inc., a corporation, at paras 20-24. 
6 In the Matter of Snapchat, Inc., a corporation, at paras 20-22. 
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information.7 However, it is not only companies that use personal data, but 
personal data has also proven valuable in the fight against terrorism. The 
U.S. government was strongly criticized after the Snowden revelations, 
which disclosed that the National Security Agency (“NSA”), inter alia, had 
accessed personal data on a generalized basis under the USA PATRIOT 
Act8 – a method, which was criticized for violating individuals’ privacy 
rights.9 The lack of knowledge among users, with regard to privacy and data 
collection practices, requires rigid privacy legislation that set the framework 
for how SNS and government authorities can use personal data. This way, 
trust can be restored among users allowing for offline rights to also apply 
online. 
 
It is the European Commission’s (“Commission”) task to restore trust in the 
way that companies and governments process personal data.10 However, the 
borderless digital world presents challenges for the enforcement of privacy 
rights as different nations provide their citizens’ with different privacy 
protection. These challenges become especially prominent with regard to 
transatlantic transfers of EU citizens’ personal data, due to the discrepancy 
between the EU and the U.S. privacy protection. Whereas the EU believes 
that individuals have a fundamental right to privacy and personal data, 
which has resulted in a strong protection for EU citizens, the U.S. has a 
fragmented and sectorial privacy protection leaving its citizens with a weak 
protection for their privacy.11 In addition, the proposed General Data 
Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) strengthens EU citizens’ fundamental right 
to privacy as it contains an express provision of the right to erasure12 (“the 
right to be forgotten”), which may drive the EU and the U.S. even further 
apart. To bridge the differences, the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor program (“the 
Safe Harbor”) was negotiated to facilitate for transatlantic transfers of 
personal data. The objective was to provide a solution that would ensure an 
adequate level of protection set out in Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
                                                
7 See Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Snapchat, Inc., a corporation – 
Agreement Containing Consent Order, file no. 132 3078, 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140508snapchatorder.pdf. 
8 See Ewen Macaskill, Gabriel Dance, NSA Files: Decoded – what the revelations mean for 
you, The Guardian, 1 November 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-
surveillance-revelations-decoded#section/1; and Section 4.6. 
9 Id. 
10 Viviane Reding, A Data Protection Compact for Europe, 28 January 2014. 
11 See Section 3 and Section 4. 
12 The right to erasure of the GDPR is the equivalent to ”the right to be forgotten” first 
recognized in Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 
Mario Costeja González. The two phrases will be used synonymously throughout the 
thesis.  
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movement of such data (“the Directive”).13 However, the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (“the CJEU”) invalidated the Safe Harbor in the 
Schrems ruling.14 Here, the Court held that a third country to which personal 
data is transferred, must ensure an adequate level of protection that is 
“essentially equivalent” to the EU privacy protection.15 Given that the Safe 
Harbor did not contain any findings regarding the existence of U.S. rules 
that would guarantee the fundamental rights of EU citizens, the existing 
Safe Harbor could not ensure an effective legal protection for EU citizens’ 
right to privacy and personal data.16  
 
Pursuant to the Schrems ruling, the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party17 (“WP29”) has granted a grace period until the end of January 2016 
that allows for companies to find alternative methods for transfers of 
personal data.18 The legal situation is at this point uncertain and EU and 
U.S. companies that have relied on the Safe Harbor for transfers of personal 
data are now left with few lawful, attractive instruments for such transfers 
after the Schrems ruling. The EU and the U.S. are currently trying to 
negotiate a Safe Harbor 2.0 under which transfers to the U.S. can be done 
lawfully. Given the CJEU’s demand for an adequate level of protection that 
is “essentially equivalent” to the EU protection, one issue is whether the 
U.S. at all can satisfy the EU’s “strict” privacy protection. In addition, it is 
unclear how the discrepancy between the two privacy regimes will affect a 
Safe Harbor 2.0 in light of the requirements in the Schrems ruling and the 
right to erasure of the GDPR. 
                                                
13 See Sections 5.3-5.5. 
14 Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner (6 October 2015) 
[hereinafter: Schrems v. DPC]. 
15 See Section 5.6. 
16 Id. 
17 ”The Article 29 Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data is an independent advisory body on data protection and 
privacy, set up under Article 29 of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. It is composed 
of representatives from the national data protection authorities of the EU Member States, 
the European Data Protection Supervisor and the European Commission. Its tasks are 
described in Article 30 of Directive 95/46/EC and Article 15 of Directive 2002/58/EC. The 
Article 29 Working Party is competent to examine any question covering the application 
of the data protection directives in order to contribute to the uniform application of the 
directives. It carries out this task by issuing recommendations, opinions and working 
documents.” Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Statement of the Article 29 Working 
Party, 16 October 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-
material/press-
release/art29_press_material/2015/20151016_wp29_statement_on_schrems_judgement.pdf
. 
18 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Statement of the Article 29 Working Party, 16 
October 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-material/press-
release/art29_press_material/2015/20151016_wp29_statement_on_schrems_judgement.pdf
. 
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1.2 Purpose and Presentation of 
Questions 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how the differences between the 
EU and U.S. privacy protection will affect a Safe Harbor 2.0 in light of the 
Schrems ruling and the right to erasure of the GDPR. The following 
questions will be answered in order to satisfy this thesis’ objective: 
 
• What are the impacts of the Schrems ruling for EU and U.S. 
companies engaging in transatlantic transfers of personal data? 
• Can the U.S., at all, ensure an adequate level of protection that is 
“essentially equivalent” to the EU privacy protection? 
• How will the discrepancy between the EU and the U.S. privacy 
protection affect a future Safe Harbor 2.0? 
1.3 Definitions 
“Citizens” is defined as a data subject in accordance with article 4(1) of the 
GDPR, i.e. “an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an 
identification number, location data, online identifier or to one or more 
factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity of that person.” 
 
“Personal data” refers to EU citizens’ personal data and has been given the 
definition provided in article 4(1) of the GDPR, i.e. “any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.” 
 
“The EU privacy protection” refers to the privacy rights individuals afford 
under both EU law and European law. 
 
“The U.S. privacy protection” refers to the privacy rights individuals 
afford under both U.S. federal and state law.  
 
“Transfers” refers to the situation when an EU or a U.S. company transfers 
EU citizens’ personal data to the U.S. 
1.4 Method and Material 
This thesis is an elaboration of a “Directed Study” I did during my exchange 
year at Suffolk University Law School, academic year of 2014/2015 for 
professor Michael Rustad. The Directed Study had the working title ”Does 
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the Right to be Forgotten Signal a Need to Reform the EU-U.S. Safe 
Harbor?” and contended that the current EU-U.S. Safe Harbor was to be 
outdated by the GDPR. In this thesis I continue to discuss the clashing 
transatlantic views on privacy. The discrepancy between the two privacy 
regimes presents challanges for the transatlantic flow of EU citizens’ 
personal data for commercial purposes, and it is unclear how EU and U.S. 
companies should transfer such data in light of the proposed GDPR and the 
fact that the CJEU invalidated the current Safe Harbor.19 Consequently, a 
part of the thesis will address some aspects of my Directed Study, i.e. the 
Safe Harbor. However, the objective of this thesis is to investigate how the 
differences between the EU and U.S. privacy protection will affect a Safe 
Harbor 2.0 in light of the Schrems ruling and the right to erasure of the 
GDPR. Moreover, the conclusions in this thesis have been based on the final 
compromise text of the GDPR from the Presidency of the European Council 
to the Permanent Representatives Committee made on 15 December 2015.20 
 
The research in this thesis is based on a customary legal dogmatic method – 
a definition for which it has been found difficult to establish a homogenous 
factual content.21 Acknowledging this fact, the method and material used 
can also be described as a scientific reconstruction of legal systems.22 In this 
thesis, I will study EU and U.S. primary and secondary legislation, case law, 
guidelines, preparatory work, doctrine, and general principles. This will 
constitute an effort to systematize and structure relevant material in order to 
describe the EU and the U.S. privacy protection, the solutions for the 
clashing privacy regimes, and analyze the challenges for a Safe Harbor 2.0. 
Recent developments in this legal area have made the legal situation with 
regard to transatlantic transfers of personal data uncertain. The topic is 
current and there are many proposed changes affecting this legal area. 
Therefore, I have chosen also to use relevant news articles, and blog posts in 
my research in order to keep the information as up-to-date as possible. In 
addition, two data use policies will be used in order to illustrate the wide 
range of areas of use that personal data makes possible. The policies are 
used to illustrate how the use of personal data can be implemented in a 
company’s privacy policy and demonstrate the extent to which personal data 
can be used, not only by the company collecting the data but also by third 
                                                
19 See Section 5.4. 
20 See Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation) [first reading] - Analysis of the final compromise text with a view to 
agreement, 15 December 2015, 2012/0011 (COD) [hereinafter “GDPR”]. 
21 Sandgren, Claes, Är rättsdogmatiken dogmatisk?, at 649. 
22 Jareskog, Nils, Rättsdogmatik som vetenskap, SvJT 2004 at 4. 
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parties. This will facilitate for the reader in understanding the rationale for 
the EU privacy protecion.  
 
To understand the issues surrounding the Safe Harbor 2.0, it is important to 
provide an overview of the EU and U.S. privacy protection. Therefore, the 
thesis is also written from a comparative perspective. This provides the 
reader with an understanding of the obstacles data transfers to the U.S. now 
face. The EU material include the European Convention for the Protection 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”), the right to privacy 
and personal data of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (“the Charter”), the OECD Principles, The Directive, Google Spain v. 
AEPD, and the GDPR. Furthermore, the U.S. material include statutes 
illustrating the sectorial privacy approach, the White House proposal – 
Consumer Privacy in a Networked World, the First Amendment, the role of 
torts for privacy-based claims, Section 230 of the CDA, the Privacy Act of 
1974, the USA PATRIOT Act, and the proposal for a Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing Act. 
1.5 Delimitations 
Since the thesis is directed to readers with an understanding of EU law, 
fundamental EU law will not be addressed. A reader who wishes to be more 
familiar with EU law is suggested to read EU Law: Texts, cases, and 
materials (2015) by Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca. Moreover, as one 
aspect of this thesis is to describe the privacy protection U.S. citizens enjoy, 
a comprehensive examination of the U.S. privacy protection will not be 
provided. Rather certain statutes have been selected to provide the reader 
with a basic understanding of the U.S. privacy protection in order to 
illustrate why the U.S. does not provide an ”essentially equivalent” privacy 
protection.  
 
One aspects of this thesis to discuss the impacts of the Schrems ruling for 
EU and U.S. companies engaging in trannsfers of personal data. In doing so, 
the thesis will address the lawful means for companies to transfer EU 
citizens’ personal data to third countries. However, the research will focus 
on the Commission’s possibility to make an adequacy decision in 
accordance with article 41 of the GDPR as this provides companies with an 
attractive instrument for transfers of massive amounts of Big Data. Other 
lawful means for transfers to third countries will only be briefly touched 
upon in order to provide the reader with a basic understanding of how 
personal data lawfully can be transferred to third countries. This thesis will 
focus on the invalidated Safe Harbor in analyzing what aspects should be 
considered when negotiating a Safe Harbor 2.0 that will satisfy EU demands 
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on privacy protection. However, I will not make any speculations regarding 
the actual content of a Safe Harbor 2.0. 
 
The proposed GDPR lays down provisions for the protection of EU citizens’ 
fundamental right to privacy. As the GDPR is an extensive privacy 
legislation, this thesis is limited to focus on Chapter V of the GDPR 
addressing transfers of personal data to third countries or international 
organizations in conjunction with the right to erasure. The right to erasure 
has been chosen to facilitate for the reader in understanding the problems 
arising from the discrepancy between the two privacy regimes, with regard 
to transatlantic transfers of personal data. The provision illustrates a certain 
aspect of privacy law where the EU and U.S. privacy protection clearly 
differ. This provision is especially important as the U.S. legal order does not 
recognize the right to erasure. This will facilitate for the reader to follow the 
arguments put forward in this thesis when discussing whether the U.S., at 
all, can ensure an adequate level of protection that is ”essentially 
equivalent” and how the discrepancy will affect a Safe Harbor 2.0. 
 
Finally, I will not address the second part of the data protection reform that 
regards the proposal for a Directive on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the 
purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of 
such data, which is intended to replace the 2008 Data Protection Framework 
Decision. 
1.6 Research Position 
The CJEU’s ruling in the Schrems case has made the Safe Harbor an 
important topic to discuss as transfers of personal data is crucial to 
transatlantic trade. The outcome of the ongoing negotiations between the 
EU and the U.S. is difficult to predict, as this is just as much about politics 
as it is law. The consequences of this ruling are still being assessed and 
discussed in various forums, such as communications from the EU as well 
as articles and blog posts from both practicioners and journalists. 
Nonetheless, companies are left in obscurity when it comes to lawfool tools 
for transatlantic transfers of personal data. This is why every research that 
may shed some light on this important, yet obscure issue, is a welcome 
contribution. 
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1.7 Outline 
This thesis starts off with a brief introduction to the concept of ”Big Data” 
and how companies can benefit from such data for commercial purposes. In 
the same Section 2, the reader will be introduced to how the use of personal 
data for commercial purposes can be reflected in a company’s data use 
policy. Section 2 has as its objective to provide the reader with a basic 
understanding of how companies use personal data in their business models. 
This knowledge is key in understanding the important role personal data can 
play in companies’ business models as well as understanding the rationale 
for the development of privacy protection in the “digital age”. In Section 3, 
the reader will be introduced to the EU privacy protection and the 
developments that lead up to the right to be forgotten. An introduction to the 
U.S. privacy protection will then follow in Section 4, reflecting the 
developments of the U.S. privacy protection that are the basis for the U.S. 
vigilance to the right to be forgotten. Together, Section 4 and 5 provide the 
reader with an overview of the EU and the U.S. privacy protection. This 
knowledge is key in understanding whether the U.S. at all can ensure a level 
of protection that is “essentially equivalent” to the EU privacy protection. 
Section 5 will describe the lawful measures that have been taken to facilitate 
for transatlantic transactions involving personal data, and will especially 
focus on the Safe Harbor. The section focuses on governmental enforcement 
and self-certification of the Safe Harbor in order to provide the reader with 
an understanding of the issues surrounding the program with regard to the 
protection of EU citizens’ personal data as a fundamental right. The section 
provides the reader with knowledge that is key for understanding the 
analysis addressing the impacts of the Schrems ruling for EU and U.S. 
companies engaging in transatlantic transfers of personal data. The final 
Section 6 will analyze the legal obstacles that stem from the discrepancy 
between EU and U.S privacy protection. The section discusses the impacts 
of the Schrems ruling for EU and U.S. companies engaging in transatlantic 
transfers of personal data, whether the U.S., at all, can ensure an adequate 
level of protection that is “essentially equivalent”, as well as any 
considerations that are required when negotiating a Safe Harbor 2.0. 
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2 Big Data in the Digital World 
2.1 Everything Leaves a Digital Trace 
Unlike information in history when a piece on information was taken and 
written down, Big Data is the opposite. Everything done online leaves a 
digital trace. For example, when using Google – a search is not just an 
extraction of data, but also a contribution to valuable information that 
allows for companies such as Google to save your searches. When turning 
and twisting such data, the data may be analyzed in a way that ultimately 
creates information. The data collected ranges from what we do to where we 
live to what we eat and how we sleep. The combinations are endless and 
everything is saved. This can be used for many beneficial purposes e.g. to 
predict infection risks for pre-maturely born infants, to predict flu 
epidemics, to predict health risks from data extracted from our genes, to 
discover treatments based on genetic profiles etc. However, the 
consequences of human interaction with techonology are yet to be 
discovered. Even though such data individually may be useful, a risk is 
created when every Internet user in one way or another contributes with that 
person’s data creating a big cloud of data about peoples’ behavior that can 
be crawled through by pattern recognition algorithms. This can, inter alia, 
allow companies to target consumers for marketing purposes, which can be 
either beneficial or detrimental for the consumer.23  
2.2 Data Use as a Business Model 
The economy has rapidly moved from an industrial economy to an 
informational economy where companies such as Google or Facebook have 
as their underlying business model the use of personal data, sharing and 
earning revenue on personal data provided by private persons.24 To illustrate 
how companies can use personal data for marketing purposes one example 
can be made through Target. Target wanted to find out which of their 
customers were pregnant for marketing purposes.25 To accomplish this 
objective, Target tracked the purchases of the customers that had signed up 
for Target’s  “Baby Register” and looked for patterns. By analyzing 
                                                
23 I UR Play, The Human Face of Big Data, 27 October 2014, 
http://urplay.se/Produkter/190174-Big-data-sa-kartlaggs-hela-ditt-liv [hereinafter: The 
Human Face of Big Data]. 
24 Billy Ehrenberg, How much is you personal data worth?, The Guardian, 22 April 2014 
08.17 a.m., http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/apr/22/how-much-is-
personal-data-worth. 
25 The Human Face of Big Data. 
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customer data and purchasing patterns, Target was able to predict which 
customers were pregnant and could use this information for marketing 
purposes.26  
 
There is a new generation of practices and business models emerging, 
targeting consumers and using their personal data for commercial purposes. 
According to the World Economic Forum (WEC), personal data creates new 
opportunities for economic and societal value creation and is held to emerge 
“as a new asset class touching all aspects of society.”27 Moreover, personal 
data has been held to be “the new oil of the internet and the new currency of 
the digital world”.28  
 
While the value of personal data is growing, European citizens are worried 
about how their personal data is used online according to a new 
Eurobarometer. The trust in digital environments is low and only 15 % of 
the respondents feel that they have complete control of their online 
information whereas 31 % worry about having no control at all. 
Furthermore, seven out of ten respondents are concerned about their 
information being used for other purposes than the one for which it was 
collected. Most importantly, European citizens believe that they should have 
the same level of protection for their personal data, regardless whether the 
data processor is situated within the EU or in a third country.29 There is also 
a risk that users do not understand the extent of their consent due to 
obscurity in a company’s data policy or terms of use.30 Obscure methods 
could result in that lawful means of data use are perceived as unlawful due 
to ignorance among users.31 Consequently, there is a need to discuss how to 
best balance the businesses’ right to use personal data for commercial 
purposes and any privacy concerns for the individuals raised by such 
business models.32  
2.3 Data Use Policies 
The previous Sections 2.1 and 2.2 have described the concept of Big Data 
and how it can be used in a company’s business model. In practice, data use 
                                                
26 The Human Face of Big Data. 
27 World Economic Forum, Personal Data: The Emergence of a New Asset Class, January 
2011, at 5. 
28 Meglena Kuneva, European Consumer Commissioner, Roundtable on Online Data 
Collection, Targeting and Profiling, 31 March 2009 [hereinafter: Meglena Kuneva (2009)]. 
29 European Commission, Data Protection Eurobarometer out today, 24 June 2015, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/news/240615_en.htm [hereinafter: 
European Commission, Eurobarometer]. 
30 See Section 2.4. 
31 Interview with Karl Engdahl, Legal Counsel at Klarna AB, 27 May 2015. 
32 Meglena Kuneva (2009). 
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policies are used in order to inform users of the company’s collection of 
their personal data. One risk for companies when handling personal data is 
that the management of the company has not adopted any data use 
policies.33 Even if a personal data protection officer34 has been appointed 
within the organization, such officer must have the support from the 
management in order to secure that any privacy policy is accepted and 
implemented throughout the whole organization.35 Data useage is a concern 
for a whole organization and not for the personal data protection officer 
alone.36 Just as any other management business decision, a data use policy 
must actively be reviewed and revised in accordance with any future 
business development.37 In the following, two data use policies will 
illustrate how the use of personal data can be implemented in a company’s 
business model.  
2.3.1 Google 
Google collects information in order to improve the services that are 
provided to Google’s users. The collected information is used to calculate 
and predict anything from a user’s mother tongue to which advertisements 
or other users that may be of interest to a specific user, or suggest YouTube 
videos a user may like. The information Google collects about its users 
includes, inter alia, the information a user provides when signing up for a 
Google Account or when creating a Google Profile. It also includes the 
information that is provided from the use of Google’s services. Examples of 
such information are when a user visits a website using Google’s advertising 
services, or view and interact with Google’s advertisements and content. 
More specifically the information includes device-specific information, log 
information, location information, information about unique application 
numbers, local storage information, and cookies and similar technologies.38  
 
The collection of information allows Google to combine and analyze the 
information in order to provide personally relevant product features.39 The 
Privacy Policy acknowledges that different people have different privacy 
concerns and a goal is therefore to be transparent about the collected 
                                                
33 Björn Johansson Heigis (Forum för Dataskydd), Integritet i fokus nr 3/2015, The Data 
Protection Board’s Magazine (sv. Datainspektionens tidning), at 11 [hereinafter: Björn 
Johansson Heigis (2015). 
34 See the GDPR, art. 35-37. 
35 Björn Johansson Heigis (2015). 
36 See the GDPR, art. 35-37. 
37 Björn Johansson Heigis (2015). 
38 Google, Privacy Policy, last revised 19 August 2015, 
https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google.com/sv//intl/en-
GB/policies/privacy/google_privacy_policy_en-GB.pdf [hereinafter: Google, Privacy 
Policy]. 
39 Id. 
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information. Therefore, the users can make certain choices on how Google 
uses their personal data. However, the Privacy Policy stresses that many of 
Google’s services may not function if cookies are disabled. In some cases 
Google may also share personally identifiable information with third party 
companies, organizations, or indiviuals when Google has consent, the third 
party is a domain administrator, the information is needed for external 
processing, or for legal reasons. Additionally, non-personal identifiable 
information can be shared publicly with Google’s partners, such as 
publishers, advertisers, or connected sites, or to demonstrate trends about 
the general use of Google’s services.40  
2.3.2 Facebook 
Facebook’s Data Policy states that Facebooks collects information, not only 
about what its users do and the information that they provide but also 
information about what others do and provide about a specific user. 
Depending on the permissions granted, Facebook also collects information 
from every device, e.g. computers, phones, or iPads, where its services have 
been installed or accessed. Even information related to visits on third-party 
websites and apps that use Facebook’s services is collected. For example, 
information is collected when the website or app offer Facebook’s “Like 
button”, “Facebook Log In”, or use its measurement and advertising 
services. Each and every piece of information is used in order to provide 
Facebook’s users with customized experiences and personalized content.41 
In this way Facebook is able to understand its users interaction with the 
services Facebook provides, and the people and things their users are 
interested in, on and off its services.42 
 
The information that Facebook collects is later used to provide, improve, 
and develop its services, to communicate with its users, to show and 
measure advertisements and services, and to promote safety and security.43 
However, the information is not limited to use in Facebook’s own services 
and it can also be shared in a number of ways, e.g. to the people you share 
and communicate with, to people that see content that others share about 
you, apps, websites and third-party integrations on or using Facebook’s 
                                                
40 Google, Privacy Policy. 
41 Facebook, Data Policy, last revised: 30 January 2015, 
https://www.facebook.com/full_data_use_policy, Section I [hereinafter: Facebook, Data 
Policy], at Section II. 
42 Facebook, Data Policy. 
43 Facebook, How do we use this information?, last revised: January 2015, 
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy. 
 18 
services, sharing within Facebook companies, and any new owners.44 
Additionally, the information can be shared with third-party partners and 
customers for e.g. advertising, measurement and analytics purposes,45 and to 
vendors, service providers and other partners.46 When sharing information 
to any third-party, Facebook complies with the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor 
Framework.47 
2.4 Summary 
Based on the foregoing, Big Data has emerged as a new asset class in the 
digital age and personal data has even been held to be the new oil of the 
Internet. Today, products are not the only source of revenue for a company 
but revenue can also be earned by the use of personal data. If you have a 
Facebook account, you have surely noticed how the advertisements on your 
Facebook page changes depending on e.g. the searches you do and which 
websites you visit. Everything done online leaves a trace and everything can 
be saved, unlike in history when information was normally written down on 
a piece of paper, allowing for easy erasure of that information. Personal data 
can be twisted and turned in endless combinations to fit the preferences of a 
specific company.  
 
As illustrated by the data use policies, the use of personal data in a 
company’s business model can be extensive and it is not only information 
that the user provides but can also amount to information that others provide 
about specific user. In addition, personal data may not only be kept within 
one entity but may often also be transferred to other entities with the 
organization or to third parties. One risk for such transfers is that not all 
companies have developed a policy for how it will ensure an adequate 
protection for personal data that covers the entire chain of transfers. On the 
one hand, customized experiences can be beneficial in a sense that users are 
presented with things they like and are interested in. On the other hand, it 
can be detrimental because a user’s choices are narrowed and limited to be 
in line with the user’s previous online preferences. For example, imagine 
you want to travel abroad and search for airline tickets on Google. You click 
on a website, which contains information about travel destinations in which 
you are interested. This specific website happens to be a third-party website 
that has incorporated Facebook’s “Like button”. Because you like the 
                                                
44 Facebook, How is this information shared?, last revised: January 2015, 
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy [hereinafter: Facebook, How is this information 
shared?]. 
45 In these cases, Facebook only shares non-personally identifiable information. 
46 Facebook, How is this information shared?. 
47 Facebook, How our global services operate?, last revised: January 2015, 
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy. 
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content, you click the “Like button”. One simple click, allows Facebook to 
collect your personal data that follow from your visit on the travel site. This 
piece of information is then used to provide you with “customized 
experiences and personalized content”. Hence, there is a chance (or a risk) 
that third-party advertisements related to travels abroad will show up on 
your Facebook homepage after your visit to that third-party website.  This 
way, Facebook is able to understand how you, as a user, interact with its 
services, on as well as off its services.  
 
The consequences of human interaction with techonology are yet to be 
discovered. Pattern recognition algorithms can crawl through big clouds of 
personal data about peoples’ behavior, ultimately resulting in revenue for 
companies using personal data as a business model. This is when a need 
arises to regulate the business’ right to use personal data for commercial 
purposes for the protection of individuals’ right to privacy. As awareness of 
data use differs, it is important that individuals are provided with legislation 
that protects their right to privacy. 
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3 The EU Privacy Protection 
This thesis highlights an important transatlantic problem, i.e. the differences 
between the EU and the U.S. privacy protection. To understand the rationale 
for why the EU has given its citizens a right to be forgotten on the Internet, 
it is important to understand the developments of the EU privacy protection. 
3.1 The Fundamental Right to Privacy and 
Personal Data 
When the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009, it amended 
the two fundamental treaties constituting the EU resulting in the Treaty on 
European Union (“TEU”) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (“TFEU”). 48 Most importantly, Article 6 of the TEU sets 
out how the EU shall integrate fundamental rights into its legal order. The 
Lisbon Treaty also gives the ECHR the same legal status as the treaties, 
which enhanced the EU’s connection with the fundamental rights of the 
ECHR. Furthermore, the Treaty states that any fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the ECHR shall constitute general principles in EU law.49 
 
The right to privacy is also recognized in Article 8 of ECHR.50 In Europe, 
the notion of privacy is “a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive 
definition.”51 It encompasses the physical as well as the psychological 
integrity of a person, and can also “embrace aspects of an individual’s 
physical and social identity.” Moreover, Article 8 of the ECHR protects “the 
right to personal development, and the right to establish and develop 
relationships with other human beings and the outside world.”52  
 
In addition to the ECHR, the EU has strengthened the fundamental rights for 
European citizens through the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (“the Charter”).53 This was considered a necessity in light 
of the changes in society, social progress and scientific and technological 
                                                
48 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, OJ C 306, 17.12.2007 
[hereinafter: TEU], at 1–271. 
49 See TEU, art. 6. 
50 Directive 95/46/EC, at recital 10. 
51 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Pretty v. The United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, 
29 April 2002, at para 61. 
52 Id. 
53 European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October 
2012, 2012/C 326/02, [hereinafter: the Charter], at C 326/395. 
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developments.54 Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter state that everyone has the 
right to respect for private and family life including the person’s 
communication and the right to protection of personal data.55 Several EU 
Member States also provide a fundamental right for its citizens to access 
public records.56 This right has also been recognized in the Charter.57 
Furthermore, in Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González (“Google Spain v. AEPD”), 
the CJEU highlighted that the provisions in the Directive shall be interpreted 
in the light of the Charter.58 Through these provisions and the judgment of 
the CJEU, the EU offers a strong protection for privacy, which is 
complemented by the ECHR. 
3.2 The OECD Principles 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) 
has promoted privacy as a fundamental value since 1980 and considers this 
as a condition for the crossborder flow of personal data.59 Through the 
OECD, governments can work together and receive help in understanding 
how to best respond to new developments and concerns arising from, inter 
alia, the information economy.60  
 
Because of the borderless character of the Internet, there is a common 
interest in a strengthened international privacy framework.61 As a result, the 
OECD has provided guidelines that recommend Member Countries and 
non-Member Countries to adhere to their recommendation for how to 
handle challenges to the security in personal data.62 The 1980’s OECD 
Privacy Guidelines were revised in 2013, which recommend that eight basic 
principles should apply to personal data when it is processed in a way that 
poses a risk to privacy.63 The eight principles are: (1) the Collection 
                                                
54 The Charter, at C 326/395. 
55 The right to personal data is hereinafter included in the notion ”the right to privacy”. 
56 See The Freedom of the Press Act (sv. Tryckfrihetsförordningen), ch. 2, § 1 and; The 
Data Inspection Board, Kommissionens förslag till dataskyddsförordning (KOM (2012) 11 
slutlig), dnr: 250-2012, 12 March 2012, at 2. 
57 The Charter, art. 42. 
58 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos, Mario Costeja González (May 13, 2014) [hereinafter: Google Spain v. AEPD], at 
para 68. 
59 OECD, OECD Privacy Principles, http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/privacy.htm. 
60 OECD, The OECD Privacy Framework, 2013, 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf, at 2. 
61 Id. at 11-12. 
62 Id. at 12. 
63 OECD, Guidelines governing the protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal 
data”, art. 2 in “The OECD Privacy Framework (2013)”, 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf [hereinafter: OECD 
Guidelines], at 11 and 13.  
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Limitation Principle, (2) the Data Quality Principle, (3) the Purpose 
Specification Principle, (4) the Use Limitation Principle, (5) the Security 
Safeguards Principle, (6) the Openness Principle, (7) the Individual 
Participation Principle, and (8) the Accountability Principle.64 These 
principles were later embodied in the Data Protection Directive and provide 
the basis for the principles to which a company must adhere when 
developing its own self-regulatory principles under the Safe Harbor.65 
3.3 The Data Protection Directive 
Based on the notion of privacy as a fundamental right, the EU adopted 
Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and of the free movement of such data. This 
went into effect in October 1998.66 The objective was to remove obstacles 
with regard to the flow of personal data between Member States.67 The EU 
had acknowledged that the processing of personal data was increasing in 
economic and social activity online.68 Therefore, it was important that the 
data-processing systems contributed to an individual’s well-being and 
respected its fundamental freedoms, notably the right to privacy.69 The 
Directive requires Member States to comply with a number of principles 
relating to data quality.70 These principles require that the processing of data 
must be (a) fair and lawful; (b) collected for legitimate and specified 
reasons; (c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes 
for which it is collected; (d) accurate, and where necessary, kept up to date; 
and (e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no 
longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data was collected.71 
 
The Directive also addresses the fact that the Internet allowed personal data 
to easily cross borders, not only between Member States but also to third 
countries.72 Because the flow of personal data on the Internet operates 
                                                
64 OECD Guidelines, at 14-15. 
65 This will be discussed further in Part IV. See also Michael L. Rustad, Global Internet 
Law (2014), West Academic Publishing [hereinafter: Michael L. Rustad (2014)], at 531. 
66 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, Official Journal L 281, 23/11/1995 P. 0031 – 0050, 24 October 
1995 [hereinafter: Directive 95/46/EC]. 
67 Directive 95/46/EC, at recital 4 and 8. 
68 Directive 95/46/EC, art. 1 and recital 4. 
69 Directive 95/46/EC, at recital 2. 
70 Directive 95/46/EC, art. 6. 
71 Id. 
72 See Directive 95/46/EC, Chapter V – Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries. 
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without borders, needless to say, so must the Directive.73 In order to be able 
to regulate such processes the Directive was given extra-territorial effect 
meaning that data processors established in third countries were also subject 
to the application of the Directive.74 Accordingly, such data processors had 
to respect the Directive in practice and ensure that an adequate level of 
protection was applied when transferring personal data to third countries.75 
In adopting the Directive, the EU wanted to harmonize national legislation 
that protects fundamental freedoms, i.e. the right to privacy, of EU citizens 
concerning the processing of their personal data.76  
 
The Directive seeks to ensure an effective and complete protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms of EU citizens as well as a high level of 
protection for such rights and freedoms.77 To ensure compliance with the 
Directive, each member state had to provide a Data Protection Authority 
(“DPA”) responsible to monitor application and enforce the provisions in 
the Directive.78 Such DPA was to be given investigative powers, effective 
powers of intervention, and the power to initiate legal proceedings.79 
3.4 Google Spain v. AEPD 
This case is a historic ruling where the CJEU imposed an obligation for 
operators of search engines to remove personal information published by 
third parties relating to a person even when the publications originally were 
lawful.80 This ruling recognized a first right to be forgotten for EU data 
subjects.81 Through this ruling the broad notion of privacy as a fundamental 
right, became even broader as the CJEU extended the Directive’s reach to 
third parties that processed a EU citizen’s personal data.82 
 
In 2010, Mario Costeja Gonzáles, a Spanish national, lodged a complaint 
with the Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (“AEPD”) seeking 
erasure of personal data relating to him, which had been published and made 
                                                
73 See Directive 95/46/EC, at recital 56; and MacKay Cunningham, Diminishing 
Sovereignty: How European Privacy Law Became International Norm, 11 Santa Clara J. 
Int'l L. 421 (2012-2013) [hereinafter: MacKay Cunningham (2012-2013)], at 440. 
74 Directive 95/46/EC, at recital 20.  
75 Id. art. 25 and recitals 22, 57, and 60. 
76 Directive 95/46/EC, at recital 7; The European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, ETS 5; 213 UNTS 221 [hereinafter: 
ECHR], art. 8; The Charter, art. 8. 
77 Directive 95/46/EC, art 1 and recitals 2 and 10. See also Schrems v. DPC, at para 39. 
78 Directive 95/46/EC, art. 28.1. 
79 Directive 95/46/EC, art. 28.3. 
80 C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 
Mario Costeja González [hereinafter: Google Spain v. AEPD], May 13, 2014, at para 88. 
81 Google Spain v. AEPD, at paras 98-99. 
82 See Directive 95/46/EC, art. 4. 
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public by the daily newspaper, La Vanguardia and Google Spain or Google 
Inc.83 The original La Vanguardia articles regarded true stories about Mr. 
Costeja González’s insolvency.84 However, as these proceedings had been 
resolved for over a decade, he contended that the information was now 
entirely irrelevant.85 The AEPD held that the personal information relating 
to the La Vanguardia articles were legally justified, as they were part of a 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs order.86 However, insofar the 
information was provided as links in a search result by Google’s indexing 
programs, the AEPD held that this compromised the fundamental right to 
data protection and ordered Google to remove or conceal the links.87 Google 
Spain and Google Inc. brought separate actions against the AEPD decision 
before the Audiencia Nacional (“the National High Court”), which stayed 
the proceedings to obtain a preliminary ruling from the CJEU.88 
 
The CJEU concluded that a search engine processed personal data within 
the meaning of the Directive as the activity of a search engine consists of 
“finding information published or placed on the internet by third parties, 
indexing it automatically, storing it temporarily and, finally, making it 
available to internet users according to a particular order of preference.”89 
Moreover, the operator of the search engine was also regarded as the 
‘controller’ in respect of that processing.90 The Court held that it is the 
responsibility of the controller to take every reasonable step necessary to 
ensure that the personal data is processed in a way compatible with Article 6 
of the Directive.91 Incompatibility may arise when the data is inaccurate, 
inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes for which the 
data is processed.92 
 
Furthermore, in its reasoning, the Court considered, inter alia, the 
Directive’s objective and concluded that the provisions had to be interpreted 
in the light of the fundamental rights set out in the Charter, and the principle 
of proportionality.93 By displaying results after merely typing in a person’s 
name, a search engine could significantly affect fundamental rights to 
privacy and the protection of personal data.94 Given that a search engine’s 
                                                
83 Google Spain v. AEPD, at paras 14-15. 
84 Id. at para 14. 
85 Id. at para 15. 
86 Id. at para 16. 
87 Id. at paras 17, 28. 
88 Id. at paras 18, 20. 
89 Id. at para 41.  
90 Id. at para 41. 
91 Id. at para 72. 
92 Id. at para 92. 
93 Id. at paras 66-68. 
94 Id. at para 80. 
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list of results of information based on a person’s name provides easy access 
and plays a decisive role in the dissemination of that information, this was 
concluded to “constitute a more significant interference with the data 
subject’s fundamental right to privacy than the publication on [a] web 
page.”95 The CJEU therefore concluded that a data subject had a right to 
have content relating to his or her name removed from a list of result 
provided by a search engine in accordance with his or her fundamental 
rights set out in the Charter.96 Nonetheless, the original information could 
still be accessed using other search terms than the person’s name, or by 
direct access to the original source.97 Consequently, complete deletion of the 
link generated by the indexing programs is not required.98 
 
In conclusion, Google Spain v. AEPD, has given data subjects a right to 
request, under certain conditions, search engines to de-list links in search 
results based on his or her name.99 It is important that data controllers adapt 
the processing of personal data to the CJEU’s ruling, and implement new 
routines, which will guarantee an effective and complete protection of the 
data subject’s right to be forgotten.100 However, it should be noted that the 
right to be forgotten does not override any EU or Member State legislation 
requiring the retention of any personal data subject to a takedown request.101 
3.5 The General Data Protection 
Regulation 
To create a Single Digital Market within the EU, the European Commission 
proposed a comprehensive reform with the objective to strengthen online 
privacy rights for EU citizens and enhance the digital economy.102 The 
GDPR has as its objective to “reinforce data protection rights of individuals, 
facilitate the free flow of personal data in the digital single market and 
reduce [the] administrative burden.”103 The reform is also intended to 
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increase European citizens’ trust in digital services.104 Furthermore, the 
inconsistency in how Member States implement the Directive has resulted 
in complexity, legal uncertainty, and administrative costs.105 To ensure 
individuals right to privacy, there was a need to introduce a robust set of 
rules that are effective in the digital age. The GDPR will modernize the 
privacy principles set out in the Directive and focuses on “reinforcing 
individuals' rights, strengthening the EU internal market, ensuring stronger 
enforcement of the rules, streamlining international transfers of personal 
data and setting global data protection standards.” The reform will 
especially ensure the protection of individuals’ personal data when meeting 
the challenges of the borderless Internet. This will result in control and 
easier access by the individuals to which the personal data belong.106 On 15 
December 2015, the European Parliament and the Council presented their 
agreement on the final compromise text of the GDPR, which was presented 
by the Presidency of the European Council to the Permanent 
Representatives Committee.107 The proposed GDPR will enter into force 
two years after adoption, at the earliest by 2018 if the current time frames 
are upheld108, and will replace the Directive.109  
 
According to the Eurobarometer, EU citizens are concerned about the 
protection of their personal data and how it is used online.110 As 
consciousness about online use of personal data is growing, the EU 
legislator has recognized the need to have an effective enforcement to 
ensure that EU citizens’ fundamental right to privacy and personal data is 
upheld.111 The concerns of EU citizens are addressed by a specific set of 
rules, which include the right to be forgotten, easier access to one’s data and 
right to data portability, the right to know when one’s data has been hacked, 
data protection by design and default, and stronger enforcement of the 
rules.112 In addition, the GDPR also aims to strengthen the powers of 
national data protection authorities.113  
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However, it is not only individuals the reform will benefit. For companies, 
the GDPR will result in clarity and consistency in application of the rules.114 
It also restores the trust of consumers, which will be beneficial for 
companies when operating on the “Digital Single Market”. The GDPR will 
(1) eliminate any inconsistencies between Member States will be replaced 
by a single law for data protection, (2) introduce a one-stop-shop, making it 
cheaper and simpler for companies to do business when only having to deal 
with one single supervisory authority, (3) apply to all companies regardless 
where they are established when they offer goods or services on the EU 
market, and (4) enable innovation to thrive.115  
3.5.1 The Right to Erasure 
Article 17 of the GDPR gives an EU citizen a right to request, under certain 
conditions, a controller of personal data to erase the citizen’s personal data 
and to inform any third party that such request has been made.116 This 
provides all EU citizens with a right to be forgotten, a right which was first 
recognized in Google Spain v. AEPD when interpreting the provisions in the 
Directive.117 In particular, this right can be exercised when the data is no 
longer necessary.118  
 
The methodology for when and how the data subject may successfully claim 
a right of erasure is provided in the article: 
 
“The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the 
controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her 
without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation 
to erase personal data without undue delay where one of the 
following grounds applies: 
(a) the data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for 
which they were collected or otherwise processed; 
(b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is 
based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or point (a) of 
Article 9(2), and where there is no other legal ground for the 
processing of the data; 
(c) the data subject objects to the processing of personal data 
pursuant to Article 19(1) and there are no overriding legitimate 
grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects to the 
processing of personal data pursuant to Article 19(2); 
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(d) they have been unlawfully processed; 
(e) the data have to be erased for compliance with a legal 
obligation in Union or Member State law to which the controller 
is subject; 
(f) the data have been collected in relation to the offering of 
information society services 
referred to in Article 8(1).”119 
 
The article also provides an obligation for the data controller to inform third 
party websites that a request of erasure has been made. This gives the data 
controller the role as an intermediary between the data subject and any third 
party websites that have published personal data subject to the erasure 
request.120 However, the obligation only includes “reasonable steps” to 
inform a third party, taking into account available technology and the cost of 
implementation.121 If the conditions set out in Article 17.1 of the GDPR are 
satisfied, the data controller shall erase the personal data without delay.122  
 
The media’s reports of the right to be forgotten have lead citizens to believe 
that there is an absolute right to have their personal data erased. This is 
however an incorrect assumption given the exceptions to the right to be 
forgotten.123 Because of the incorrect assumptions, trust and transparency 
have become essential facilitators in gaining access to citizens’ data.124 At 
the same time there are many companies, which choose control over sharing 
their data practices with citizens. In these cases, the key word is forgiveness 
rather than permission.125 Such practices can lead to the belief that 
companies, which are transparent with their data practices to be perceived, 
as if they are the companies that collect personal data in an illegal 
manner.126 Therefore, transparency is important for data practices in order to 
not make it a disincentive for companies that actually are transparent with 
their users. Clear and transparent information about the collection of 
personal data in e.g. a privacy statement or policy also provides users with 
an understanding of the company’s business. Noteworthy is that the latest 
version of the GDPR includes a “further processing” provision, addressing 
Big Data, and that any further processing be compatible with the original 
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purpose for which the data was collected.127 The provision also lays down 
factors to consider when assessing the compatibility for such further 
processing.128 The GDPR demands that any further processing for other 
purposes than the original purpose, for which the data was collected, is 
based on the data subject’s consent.129 At the same time, the GDPR provides 
that the information given to data subjects concerning processing should be 
extensive.130 Thus, the new requirements concerning further processing and 
information present companies with new challenges in how to meet the 
requirements in a clear and transparent manner.  
3.5.2 Exceptions to the Right to Erasure 
As mentioned above, article 17 of the GDPR provides an exception to the 
obligation of erasure of the data controller. The exceptions applies when the 
retention of the personal data is necessary and one of the following 
conditions apply: 
 
“(a) for exercising the right of freedom of expression and 
information; 
(b) for compliance with a legal obligation which requires 
processing of personal data by Union or Member State law to 
which the controller is subject or for the performance of a task 
carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official 
authority vested in the controller; 
(c) for reasons of public interest in the area of public health in 
accordance with Article 9(2)(h) and (hb) as well as Article 9(4); 
(d) for archiving purposes in the public interest, or scientific and 
historical research purposes or statistical purposes in accordance 
with Article 83(1) in so far as the right referred to in paragraph 1 
is likely to render impossible or seriously impair the achievement 
of the objectives of the archiving purposes in the public interest, 
or the scientific and historical research purposes or the statistical 
purposes. 
(e) for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.”131 
 
The exceptions of freedom of expression and historical and scientific 
research allow for e.g. news websites to operate on the basis of these 
principles.132 For example, politicians cannot expect to have data, which 
was published with regard to his or her official position, removed from the 
website.133 Additionally, because an assessment has to be made in each 
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specific case, this could be problematic as there is a risk that U.S. 
companies do such assessments based on U.S. privacy policies.134 
 
The right to erasure is a key provision in the new privacy reform. It 
strengthens EU citizens’ fundamental right to privacy as there now is an 
express provision regarding the right to be forgotten. This allows for erasure 
requests and clarifies this right, which was first articulated in Google v. 
AEPD’s. The following section introduces the reader to the U.S.’ vigilance 
to the right to be forgotten. 
 
  
 
                                                
134 See Section 4, which discusses the U.S. Vigilance to the Right to Be Forgotten. 
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4 The U.S.’ Vigilance to the 
Right to Be Forgotten 
4.1 Sectorial Privacy v. Comprehensive 
Privacy 
In contrast to the EU, the U.S. does not have any comprehensive unanimous 
data protection laws, but rather it has chosen a sectorial approach. This 
approach renders data protection decentralized, fragmented, industry-
specific, and largely uncoordinated among varying levels of government.135 
Therefore, when examining the privacy rights afforded under U.S. law, it is 
necessary to analyze all privacy-related statutes for a complete 
understanding of the U.S. privacy protection.136 Various statutes such as the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act137, the Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act138, the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act139, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act140 provide a flawed patchwork of privacy legislation for U.S. citizens.141 
This was also acknowledged in the White House’s proposal, Consumer 
Data Privacy in a Networked World (“the White House’s proposal”).142  An 
example of the U.S. sectorial approach was well illustrated in MacKay 
Cunningham’s, Diminishing Sovereignty: How European Privacy Law 
Became International Norm:  
 
“Examples of the U.S. sectorial approach include the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which restricts 
telecommunications carriers' use of private customer 
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Information; the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which restricts 
financial institutions' use and dissemination of private financial 
data; 166 and the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, 
which restricts credit reporting and increases protections for 
related personal information. Whereas the European Directive 
articulates a single definition of personal information that 
governs its twenty-seven Member States, the U.S. sectorial 
approach breeds [multiple, often disparate, definitions]. The 
definition of personal data under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 
for example, differs from the Video Privacy Protection Act, 
which differs from the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.”143 
 
As cross-border data flows have become a vital commercial component, 
international interoperability is crucial.144 This is one of the reasons for the 
White House’s proposal that was released in February 2012.145 The rationale 
of the proposal was the need to address issues of “basic privacy principles 
that applied to the commercial world, and a sustained commitment of all 
stakeholders to address consumer data privacy issues.”146 This is to be 
accomplished by a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights built on the Fair 
Information and Practice Principle. The bill will give consumers 
comprehensive, actionable, and flexible privacy rights that translate to the 
dynamic environment of the Internet.147 Specifically, the Consumer Privacy 
Bill of Rights will provide for: individual control, transparency, respect for 
context, security, access and accuracy, focused collection, and 
accountability.148 The proposal suggests enforcement through both self-
regulatory bodies that will strengthen trust and commitment by companies 
in a code of conduct, and enforcement by the FTC.149 Even though the 
Administration introduces a concept of mutual recognition,150 the right to be 
forgotten has been held to be an “impermissibly antithetical” and an 
obstacle for unifying the transatlantic privacy regimes.151 This discrepancy 
between the EU and the U.S. presents challenges in creating a uniform 
international privacy standard that facilitates for transatlantic transfers of 
personal data.  
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4.2 Freedom of Speech 
” Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a 
concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this 
exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places 
a primary value on freedom of speech and of press.”152 
 
This citation of the U.S. Supreme Court provides an understanding of the 
American position towards privacy. The key rationale for resisting the 
adoption of a national data protection regulation has been the constitutional 
right of free speech.153 The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
expressly protects free speech of U.S. citizens and was ratified in 1789.154 
The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law […] abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press.155 Even if free speech compromises 
privacy interests, it is generally the latter that must give way as the First 
Amendment is construed to protect the free flow of information.156 
Defendants of the U.S. approach to data privacy contend that limitations of 
the sharing of personal information are a violation of the First 
Amendment.157 
4.3 Privacy Based Cybertorts 
Supplementing Data Protection Laws  
Where the patchwork of privacy legislation fails to provide protection, U.S. 
citizens have the option of tort as a cause of action.158 The causes of action 
for invasion of privacy comprise four different torts: (1) intrusion upon 
seclusion, (2) right of publicity, (3) public disclosure of private facts, and 
(4) false light.159 However, U.S. courts have been reluctant to stretch the tort 
of privacy to the Internet.160  
 
All privacy-based torts, except for right of publicity, require that the 
invasion of a person’s privacy must be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person, which has been an obstacle for plaintiffs to prevail in privacy-based 
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causes of actions.161 In Booring v. Google, Inc, the plaintiff’s intrusion upon 
seclusion and right to publicity claims were dismissed because a reasonable 
person would not find a Google Street View car taking pictures of them to 
be “highly offensive”.162 The “highly offensive” prong in a torts claim 
leaves U.S. citizens with a weak protection for their private life and personal 
data. This also demonstrates the risk that EU citizens’ face when their data 
has been transferred to the U.S. with regard to the possibility to prevail on a 
legal claim concerning their fundamental right to privacy. 
4.4 Section 230 of the CDA 
To entirely understand the U.S.’ vigilance towards the right to be forgotten 
it is also important to mention Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act (“Section 230 of the CDA”). Congress enacted Section 230 of the CDA 
because of the U.S. policy to promote development of the Internet and to 
preserve a vibrant and free market with regard to the Internet and interactive 
computer services.163 The section provides immunity for websites from 
liability for third party postings.164 More specifically, websites are not 
regarded as publishers or speakers of information posted by third parties and 
can therefore not be held liable for defamatory content.165 Neither can they 
be held liable for failing to remove tortious content.166 In Zeran v. America 
Online, Inc, the Court ruled that Section 230 provides immunity for service 
providers even when refusing to take down illegal defamatory content 
posted by third parties after receiving notice.167 Consequently, Section 230 
provides a broad immunity for websites reflecting the U.S. privacy 
protection. In contrast, the CJEU’s ruling in Google Spain v. AEPD went so 
far as to even impose a duty for search engines to remove irrelevant content 
in relation to a person’s name.168 This provides an example on the difference 
of the transatlantic privacy protection. Where the U.S. provides immunity 
for websites for defamatory third party content, the EU imposes liability 
even for search engines that merely finds information published or placed 
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on the Internet by third parties, indexes it automatically, stores it 
temporarily and, makes it available to Internet users.169 
4.5 No Tradition of the Right to be 
Forgotten 
The U.S. reluctance towards the right to be forgotten, and the absence of 
such right in the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, may lead to the 
assumption that the U.S. in all aspects has distanced itself from such a 
right.170 Although a U.S. right to be forgotten in EU standards may be 
considered undeveloped, it is incorrect to assume that a right to be forgotten 
in the U.S. does not exist altogether.171 In fact, the right to be forgotten has 
been recognized on a state level, in relation to some specific cases.172 
4.5.1 Juvenile Offenses 
Even though the notion of the right to be forgotten has yet to reach 
information on the Internet, there are other contexts in which the right to be 
forgotten has been acknowledged. One example is the expungement of 
juvenile offenses, which is treated under different statutes than when a 
defendant is an adult.173 For juvenile offenders, most states provide 
procedures that allow them to have a juvenile court conviction expunged 
upon filing a petition in court.174 The records can then be destroyed, 
expunged, sealed or otherwise made permanently inaccessible.175 One state 
has even made expungement mandatory unless the state can show good 
cause for the retention of the records.176 Through this possibility, a juvenile 
offender may choose to not disclose its criminal record to a prospective 
employer, property owner, or licensing agency.177 
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4.5.2 Personal Data of Minors 
Furthermore, in 2013, the state of California passed Senate Bill No. 568, 
which went into effect on January 1, 2015.178 The Bill provides a right for 
minors to request an online operator to remove content posted by the minor 
on a website.179 Unlike GDPR’s right to be forgotten, minors cannot request 
an online operator to remove data related to them as the right only covers 
postings made by the minors themselves.180 Although this right may be 
considered limited in comparison with the GDPR’s right to be forgotten181, 
the right for minors to have their personal data removed is hopefully one 
step closer to approximation between the transatlantic regimes.  
4.6 The Privacy Act of 1974 
The Privacy Act of 1974 has as its objective to provide a comprehensive 
regulation of how personal data is processed.182 The Act establishes a code 
for federal agencies in which the collection, maintenance, uses, and 
dissemination of all types of personal information is regulated.183 This is the 
most approximate U.S. legislation to a European data protection law.184 
However, the protection is only afforded in relation to federal governmental 
bodies and even though it exists, the following Sections 4.7 and 4.8 
demonstrates that the protection can be undermined. 
4.7 The Patriot Act 
As will be illustrated by the Schrems case, one important aspect of the U.S. 
approach to privacy is the USA PATRIOT Act (“the Patriot Act”). Pursuant 
to 9/11, Congress enacted the Patriot Act with the objective to unite and 
strengthen America by providing appropriate tools required to intercept and 
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obstruct terrorism”.185 The Act allows U.S. authorities to, inter alia, 
examine business records in national security terrorism cases.186 Before the 
Patriot Act, such information could only be obtained by a grand jury 
subpoena, which was not considered appropriate with regard to national 
security cases.187 In addition, the U.S. government can obtain business 
records by asking the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court which can 
order the production of the same type of documents available through a 
grand jury subpoena.188 In light of the Snowden revelations, the Patriot Act 
is alleged to have resulted in access to records of personal data on a 
generalized basis.189 The NSA defended itself stating, “if you have nothing 
to hide, you have nothing to fear.”190 However, the nothing-to-hide 
argument pervades discussions on privacy and the critique against U.S. 
authorities to access business records of personal data remains. 
4.8 The Cybersecurity Information 
Sharing Act of 2015 
On 27 October 2015, the Senate passed the controversial Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing Act of 2015 (“CISA”).191 The Act has as its objective 
to encourage the sharing of cyber threat information amongst private entities 
and between private entities and the federal government.192 Consequently, 
the bill permits cross-sharing of information between entities and/or the 
federal government in cases where the information includes “cyber-threat 
indicators” and “defensive measures” that are consistent with a 
“cybersecurity purpose”.193 In reality, this means that entities and the federal 
government can share technical information, which indicates attacks on 
networks, and how such entities or the government have successfully 
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detected, prevented, or mitigated such attacks.194 Most importantly, an entity 
that wishes to participate in the program is offered significant protection. 
The CISA expressly states that entities sharing information under the 
program are effectively immune from liability.195 Hence, there is an express 
prohibition of any cause of action against an entity that monitor or share 
information in accordance with the Act.196 The bill’s opponents have argued 
that this strips individuals of their basic privacy protection, as there is no 
possibility for individuals to opt out of CISA-sponsored monitoring.197 The 
counter-arguments point to the fact that prior to sharing information, entities 
are required to review and remove any “irrelevant personally-identifiable 
information that may be contained in cyber threat indicators or defensive 
measures.”198 Yet again, EU citizens may be faced with the issue of having 
the U.S. government and U.S. companies deciding the fate of their personal 
data in accordance with U.S. policies with no regard for the EU fundamental 
right to privacy. 
 
There clearly is a discrepancy between the EU and the U.S. privacy 
protection. However, personal data has become a valuable asset of 
transatlantic trade. This is why the discrepancy cannot result in a suspension 
of transfers of personal data altogether. The following section examines the 
solutions for the clashing privacy regimes with regard to transfers of 
personal data.  
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5 Solutions for Clashing 
Privacy Regimes 
5.1 Transatlantic Transfers of Personal 
Data 
Transfers of personal data to third countries are addressed in Chapter V of 
the GDPR. Pursuant to this chapter, one instrument for lawful transfers of 
such data is if the third country in question can ensure an adequate level of 
protection for personal data.199 It is the Commission that decides if such 
protection is ensured.200 In determining whether this condition has been met, 
the Commission shall consider the following: 
 
“ a) the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, relevant legislation, both general and sectorial, 
including concerning public security, defence, national security 
and criminal law and the access of public authorities to personal 
data, as well as the implementation of this legislation, data 
protection rules[,] professional rules and security measures, 
including rules for onward transfer of personal data to another 
third country or international organisation, which are complied 
with in that country or international organisation, jurisprudential 
precedents, as well as effective and enforceable data subject 
rights and effective administrative and judicial redress for the 
data subjects whose personal data are being transferred; 
(b) the existence and effective functioning of one or more 
independent supervisory authorities in the third country or to 
which an international organisation is subject, with responsibility 
for ensuring and enforcing compliance with the data protection 
rules, including adequate sanctioning powers for assisting and 
advising the data subjects in exercising their rights and for 
assisting and advising the data subjects in exercising their rights 
and for co-operation with the supervisory authorities of the 
Member States; and 
(c) the international commitments the third country or 
international organisation concerned has entered into, or other 
obligations arising from legally binding conventions or 
instruments as well as from its participation in multilateral or 
regional systems, in particular in relation to the protection of 
personal data.”201  
 
                                                
199 GDPR, art. 41.1. 
200 Id. art. 41.3. 
201 Id. art. 41.2. 
 40 
Consequently, when the Commission deems that a third country ensures an 
adequate level of protection for personal data, no further authorization is 
required for transfers to that country.202 The provision gives the 
Commission the power to provide companies with an attractive instrument 
for transfers of personal data to third countries, which ultimately facilitates 
for transatlantic trade.  
 
The final compromised version of the GDPR contains two additions to the 
original wording in the Commission’s proposal made in 2012. The two 
conditions that have been added to the methodology for the assessment of 
an adequate level of protection of importance to this thesis are (1) respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and (2) the access of public 
authorities to personal data.203 Moreover, a new article has been added, 
which provides that any court judgment that require a company to transfer 
or disclose personal data is only recognized and enforceable if its been 
authorized by EU law.204   
5.2 Lawful Instruments for Data Transfers 
In cases where the Commissions has not made an adequacy decision, 
personal data can still be transferred to a third country if the data controller 
or processor can provide appropriate safeguards in a legally binding 
instrument.205 Such safeguards can constitute e.g. binding corporate rules or 
standard protection clauses.206 Pursuant to the Schrems decision, the WP29 
has stated that it considers transfers under Standard Contractual Rules 
(“SCR”) and Binding Corporate Rules lawful until the end of January, 
making their future existence uncertain.207 Moreover, the SCR contain the 
same exception as the invalidated Safe Harbor and provide that mandatory 
national legislation do not contradict the SCR.208 Consequently, there is 
reason to believe that the SCR as they are formulated today are also an 
unacceptable instrument for transfers. Additionally, other lawful instruments 
for transfers of personal data are when (1) the data subject has given its 
consent; (2) the transfer is necessary for the performance or conclusion of a 
contract; or (3) the transfer is necessary for public interest, or legal 
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claims.209 Regarding transfers based on consent, the German DPAs consider 
that strict requirements apply and that such transfers may not generally take 
place repeatedly, excessively, or routinely.210  
5.3 History of the Safe Harbor 
As mentioned above, article 41 of the GDPR211 provides the Commission 
with the power to provide companies with an attractive instrument for 
transferring personal data to third countries. When the Directive entered into 
force, U.S. companies were concerned with how to transfer EU citizens’ 
personal data in a way that would satisfy the “strict” directive.212 These 
concerns are still relevant with regard to the adoption of the GDPR. Given 
the concerns, the U.S. and the EU negotiated the Safe Harbor with the 
objective to develop a program for how U.S. companies could comply with 
the Directive.213 In order to provide transparency for U.S. companies, the 
Safe Harbor program was negotiated as a way to harmonize the transatlantic 
views on the protection of personal data.214 The Safe Harbor also provided 
streamlined and cost-effective means for U.S. companies to comply with the 
Directive.215 
 
The Safe Harbor acknowledges that both the U.S. and the EU are working to 
enhance privacy protection for their citizens.216 However, the protection of 
privacy is regarded from two different perspectives where the U.S. has a 
sectorial approach consisting of a mix of legislation, regulation, and self-
regulation. To bridge the differences between the EU and the U.S, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce issued the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and 
Frequently Asked Questions.217 Pursuant to the Directive, the Commission 
decided that compliance with the Principles was considered to ensure an 
adequate level of protection when transferring personal data from the EU to 
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the U.S. (“the Safe Harbor decision”).218 However, on 25 June 2013, 
Austrian law student Maximilian Schrems challenged this decision resulting 
in the CJEU declaring the decision invalid.219  
5.4 The Content of the Safe Harbor 
5.4.1 The Safe Harbor Principles 
The Principles create an assumption of satisfying the requisite of an 
adequate level of protection when transferring personal data to third 
countries set out in article 25 of the Directive.220 The seven principles in the 
Safe Harbor Framework include:  
1) The Notice Principle: requiring companies to give notice in a clear 
and conspicuous language to individuals about the purposes for 
which they collect and use their personal data, and of any disclosures 
of such data to third parties;  
2) The Choice Principle: requiring companies to give individuals a 
choice to opt out when the personal data may be disclosed to a third 
party or used for a purpose incompatible with the purpose for which 
it was originally collected;  
3) The Onward Transfer Principle: requiring companies to apply the 
principles of notice and choice when disclosing the personal data to 
third parties;  
4) The Access Principle: requiring companies to give individuals a 
right to correct, amend, or delete information a company holds 
where it is inaccurate and the request for correcting, amending, or 
deleting is proportionate;  
5) The Security Principle: requiring companies to take reasonable 
precautions to protect the personal data;  
6) The Data Integrity Principle: requiring that the personal data must be 
relevant for the purposes for which it is to be used; and 
7) The Enforcement Principle: ensuring compliance with the Principles 
and provides that a company shall have (a) readily and affordable 
independent recourse mechanisms, (b) proceedings for verifying that 
companies implement the Principles, and (c) sufficiently rigorous 
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remedies to ensure compliance with the Principles and that such 
remedies are enforced if a company fails to do so.221   
5.4.2 Enforcement by Self-Regulation 
The Safe Harbor’s Enforcement Principle consists of three requirements. 
Firstly, a company must have an independent recourse mechanism.222 This 
is similar to other U.S. privacy laws where the exclusive remedy is to bring 
a civil law suit if a company violates such laws.223 The independent recourse 
mechanism gives companies several options. For instance, they can “self-
certify” their use and aggregation of personal data through private e-sector 
privacy programs, such as BBB EU Safe Harbor Program or TRUSTe.224 
Another option is commitment to cooperate with the EU member states’ 
Data Protection Authority or other private independent recourse 
mechanisms that “meet the requirements of the Enforcement Principle and 
the FAQ”. They also have to option to comply with “legal or regulatory 
supervisory authorities that provide for handling of individual complaints 
and dispute resolution.”225 However, this does not amount to allowing the 
company itself to be its own “independent recourse mechanism.”226 A 
company can also qualify for the Safe Harbor by setting up its own self-
regulatory privacy program provided it conforms to the Principles.227 
Failure to comply with its own self-regulation must be actionable under 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.228 Secondly, a company 
must also verify that it has implemented its stated privacy principles. This 
requirement can be met by either submitting annual outside compliance 
reviews or by self-verification.229 Thirdly, a company must provide 
remedies that can reverse any effects of non-compliance with the Principles, 
and ensure future compliance when processing personal data.230 Such 
remedies should include publicity for findings of non-compliance and 
requirement to delete personal data.231 However, it is within the discretion 
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of the dispute resolution body to decide whether sanctions for non-
compliance should be used.232  
 
Consequently, the company decides whether or not to delete the personal 
data depending on the sensitivity of the data and whether it has collected, 
used, or disclosed the data “in blatant contravention of the Principles.”233 If 
a company fails to comply with the Principles, an independent recourse 
mechanism must notify such failure to the Department of Commerce and the 
governmental body with applicable jurisdiction, which is usually the Federal 
Trade Commission.234 Furthermore, the Principles suggest that sanctions 
include “suspension and removal of a seal, [and] compensation for 
individuals for losses incurred as a result of non-compliance and injunctive 
orders.”235 
5.4.3 Enforcement by Governmental Bodies 
In addition to a company’s option to self-regulate compliance with the 
Principles, the FTC was given authority to ensure that U.S. companies 
comply with the Safe Harbor framework.236 The FTC has authority to 
regulate any “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.”237 This means that the FTC can only initiate actions when a 
company has failed to protect personal data “in accordance with their 
representations and/or commitments.”238 For instance, as in the Snapchat 
example where Snapchat misrepresented the use of data in its privacy 
policy.239 Accordingly, such failure gives the FTC the power to prosecute 
any false representation as deceptive trade.240 Several types of remedies are 
available to the FTC, such as a cease and desist order, restraining orders or 
injunctions, and in severe cases the FTC can promulgate an administrative 
ruling barring an act or practice as per se unfair or deceptive.241  
 
One of the criticisms raised against the Safe Harbor was whether the internal 
and external enforcement mechanism is inadequate.242 As of 12 November 
2014, the FTC had brought ten enforcement actions since it went into force 
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in July 2000.243 However, since 2009, the FTC has brought 24 Safe Harbor 
cases and only in 2014 the FTC obtained separate settlements with fourteen 
companies that allegedly falsely claimed that they complied with the Safe 
Harbor.244 From the FTC’s own statistics follow that from 2009 until 2013, 
only ten Safe Harbor actions were brought over the course of five years, 
while in 2014 more than half of the enforcement actions were brought in 
just one year. The inconsistency in the FTC’s enforcement of the Safe 
Harbor may have given critics a basis for alleging that the Safe Harbor’s 
self-regulatory nature has failed to provide a surveillance mechanism 
adequate enough to ensure the protection of EU citizens’ personal data. 
Additionally, the FTC’s lack of efficient enforcement actions left EU 
citizens to report a company’s violation of the Safe Harbor on their own.245 
For instance, if a U.S. company was subject to a data breach where 
thousands of identities were stolen, the company does not have an 
obligation to notify EU citizens under the Safe Harbor.246 Moreover, the 
Safe Harbor does not address the right to be forgotten and U.S. companies 
have yet to recognize such right.247  
5.5 Efforts to Make the Safe Harbor Safer 
Pursuant to the Safe Harbor decision, the Commission issued a Staff 
Working Document on the implementation of its prior decision.248 In the 
report, the Commission expressed its disappointment for the low number of 
registrants.249 The number was lower than initially anticipated and raised 
concerns whether the benefits of the Safe Harbor, both for companies and 
data subjects, were sufficient.250 The Commission’s report concluded that 
there was significant non-compliance with the Principles.251 For instance, 
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“less than half of organisations post privacy policies that reflect all seven 
Safe Harbour Principles.”252 Specifically, the report called for a more 
proactive FTC in monitoring organizations compliance with the 
Principles.253 The report urged the FTC to encoure data subjects to protect 
their rights and to seek FTC intervention, inform Safe Harbor members 
about the requirements, and to initiate actions in cases where the 
requirement is not satisfied.254  
 
As of March 2013, the Department of Commerce made it mandatory for 
companies that had made commitments to the Safe Harbor program to make 
its privacy policy for customer data readily available on its public 
website.255 This way, EU citizens could immediately verify whether or not a 
U.S. company had undertaken to comply with the Safe Harbor by visiting 
the official Safe Harbor List and website.256 In its communication from the 
Commission to the European Council, it was yet again pointed out that there 
was a need to make the Safe Harbor safer.257 Although the number of 
certified companies had increased to 3246 as of 2013258, the lack of 
enforcement and transparency was held to have a negative impact on the 
fundamental rights of EU citizens.259 Furthermore, it put EU companies at 
disadvantage when competing with U.S. companies that had joined the 
program but did not comply with the Principles.260 To solve any compliance 
issues arising from the Safe Harbor, the Commission stated that the 
Department of Commerce must ensure incorporation by providing a 
methodology of compliance under which U.S. companies would comply 
with the Principles when handling EU citizens’ personal data.261  
5.6 The End of the Safe Harbor 
The concerns truly escalated on 25 June 2015 when Austrian law student 
Maximilian Schrems lodged a complaint with Ireland’s data protection 
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commissioner alleging that Facebook Ireland’s transfer of his personal data 
to the U.S. could not be guaranteed an adequate level of protection in light 
of the Snowden revelations.262 On 25 July 2014, the High Court of Ireland 
referred the case to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling to, inter alia, decide 
whether the Safe Harbor, de facto, provides an adequate protection for 
transfers of EU citizens’ personal data.263 The Court concluded the Safe 
Harbor decision to be invalid and gave the following grounds for its 
decision.264  
 
When determining whether an adequate level of protection is offered by a 
third country, the assessment must be made by reason of the third country’s 
domestic law or its international commitments. Moreover, the adequate 
protection must be assessed in light of “the protection of the private lives 
and basic freedoms and rights of individuals.”265 The objective is to ensure 
that “the high level of […] protection continues where personal data is 
transferred to a third country.”266 In order to ensure that a third country 
provides an adequate level of protection, the third country is required to 
have a level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms that is 
“essentially equivalent” to the protection provided in the EU.267 Hence, it is 
the legal order of the third country that must ensure an adequate level of 
protection. The requisite of an “essentially equivalent” level of protection 
must prove effective in practice in order to satisfy the requisite.268 In this 
regard, the Commission’s adequacy decision only concerned the adequate 
level of protection provided in the U.S. under the Safe Harbor, without 
sufficient findings of whether the U.S. ensured an adequate level of 
protection by reason of its domestic law or its international commitments.269 
Furthermore, an adequacy decision must be subject to periodical checks to 
ensure that the decision is still factually and legally justified.270 In light of 
the Charter, any review regarding the validity of an adequacy decision 
should be strict.271 
 
Even though self-certification in itself is not contrary to the requirement that 
a third country must ensure an adequate level of protection, the reliability of 
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the U.S. system was questioned as the U.S. public authorities had no 
obligation to comply with the Safe Harbor.272 The Court considered that the 
U.S. system did not provide any effective detection or supervision 
mechanism that identified and punished infringements of the Safe Harbor in 
practice.273 The Safe Harbor decision did not only allow for companies to 
self-certify to the Principles, but also stated that in cases where U.S. law 
imposes a conflicting obligation, U.S. law precedes over the principles 
pursuant to the Safe Harbor.274 The Court considered this to result in that 
U.S. organizations, receiving personal data from the EU, were bound to 
disregard the Principles without limitation whenever the Principles were in 
conflict with U.S. law.275  
 
The Court also addressed the fact that the Commission’s own assessment of 
the Safe Harbor had pointed out that U.S. authorities could access personal 
data transferred from Member States and that such data later was processed 
in a way incompatible with the original purpose “beyond what was strictly 
necessary and proportionate to the protection of national security.”276 The 
Court noted that the Safe Harbor decision did not contain any findings 
regarding the existence of U.S. rules that would limit such interference with 
the fundamental rights of EU citizens or any effective legal protection of 
such interference.277 According to the Court, it is clear that any EU 
legislation protecting fundamental rights and freedoms must lay down clear 
and precise rules governing the scope and application of measures and 
impose minimum safeguards. This in order to provide EU citizens with 
sufficient guarantees for effective protection of their personal data “against 
the risk and abuse and against any unlawful access and use for that data.”278 
Any derogation or limitation from this can only apply in so far as it is 
strictly necessary.279  
 
Additionally, the Court stated that effective protection cannot be achieved 
when storage and access by public authorities of personal data is made on a 
generalized basis.280 This was considered to compromise the very essence of 
the fundamental right to privacy. Hence, the Court held that there is no 
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respect for the fundamental right to effective judicial protection in these 
situations.281 The same is true when there is no possibility for an individual 
to pursue legal remedies in order to have access to personal data relating to 
him, or to obtain the rectification or erasure of such data.282  
 
Furthermore, the Safe Harbor decision layed down specific rules regarding 
the powers available to the national supervisory authorities in relation to the 
decision resulting in a restriction of such authorities’ investigative 
powers.283 The Court held that the Commission exceeded its powers when it 
restricted the national supervisory authorities powers.284 In addition, an 
adequacy decision cannot prevent a supervisory authority from examining a 
claim of an individual with regard to his or her fundamental rights and 
freedoms. Especially not when the claim concerned (1) the processing of 
that individual’s personal data transferred from a Member State to the third 
country; and (2) when such claim contends that the third country does not 
ensure an adequate level of protection.285 Based on the foregoing, the Court 
concluded the Safe Harbor decision invalid in its entirety.286 
5.7 The Schrems Impacts 
Pursuant to the Schrems decision, the German DPAs issued a position paper 
on the Safe Harbor.287 However, the German DPAs have not yet initiated 
any investigation, which may be due to the fact that the WP29 stated that 
this landmark ruling requires a “robust, collective, and common position on 
the implementation of the judgment.”288 Moreover, the WP29 considers 
massive and indiscriminate surveillance to be contrary to EU legislation on 
privacy and that it is also a key element of the CJEU’s analysis.289 
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unabhängigen Datenschutzbehörden des Bundes und der Länder (Datenschutzkonferenz)”, 
25 October 2015, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/german-dpas-issue-position-paper-safe-
harbor-jan-geert-meents. 
288 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Statement of the Article 29 Working 
Party, 16 October 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/pressmaterial/ 
press-
release/art29_press_material/2015/20151016_wp29_statement_on_schrems_judgement.pdf 
[hereinafter: Statement of the Article 29 Working Party (2015)]. 
289 Statement of the Article 29 Working Party (2015). 
 50 
Furthermore, it stated that a safe destination for transfers is not at hand 
when the authorities of third countries can access information beyond what 
is necessary in a democratic society. Consequently, political, legal, and 
technical solutions are required to enable transfers of personal data to the 
U.S that respect fundamental rights. The WP29 has granted companies and 
organizations a “grace period” until the end of January 2016 that allows for 
companies to find alternative methods of transfers. During this time, the 
WP29 also considers transfers under Standard Contractual Rules and 
Binding Corporate Rules as lawful. However, the WP29 demands an 
appropriate solution to be found between EU and the U.S. If a solution 
cannot be found, EU data protection authorities will be compelled to take all 
necessary and appropriate actions, which may include coordinated 
enforcement actions.290 Additionally, the alternative instruments for lawful 
transfers, i.e. the BCR and the SCR, are only considered lawful until the end 
of January 2016. Thereafter, investigations can be expected which will 
evaluate the adequacy of the BCR and the SCR and it is questionable 
whether the instruments will be upheld or quashed.291 Moreover, the GDPR 
includes provisions of stricter penalties and fines for infringements of the 
regulation.292 Each supervisory authority has the power to impose 
administrative penalties, which aim to strengthen and harmonize the 
penalties against infringements.293 Infringements regarding the data 
subject’s rights can be subject to penalties amounting to 20 000 000 EUR, 
or up to 4 % of the total annual turnover, whichever is higher.294 For now, 
companies transferring personal data across the Atlantic are not only left 
with few lawful instruments for transfers, awaiting the Safe Harbor 2.0, but 
they are also left with the fear of penalties. 
 
Because of the legal uncertainty, compliance has become important for EU 
and U.S. companies that handle personal data. One obvious, straightforward 
method to comply with the Schrems decision is to keep the data within the 
EU. For example, Oracle now offers their cloud customers the possibility to 
store data in Europe in order to avoid that data is being sent across 
geographical border or to any other legislative boundary.295 However, the 
Microsoft case shows that U.S. federal courts may consider search warrants 
issued in the U.S. sufficient to access personal data that is subject to another 
                                                
290 Statement of the Article 29 Working Party (2015). 
291 See Section 5.2. 
292 GDPR, at recital 118b. 
293 Id. at recital 120 and art. 79.1a. 
294 Id. art 79.3a. 
295 Karlin Lillington, Oracle keeps European data within its EU-based data centres, 28 
October 2015, The Irish Times, http://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/oracle-
keeps-european-data-within-its-eu-based-data-centres-1.2408505. 
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jurisdiction.296 The case is currently on appeal before the Unites States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.297 However, even if the decision is 
upheld, a company may enjoy protection under the GDPR as a court 
judgment that require a company to transfer or disclose personal data only is 
recognized and enforceable if its been authorized by EU law.298 Thus, the 
choice of storing personal data in the EU to avoid the legal impacts of the 
Schrems case may still be a reliable measure.  
 
Optimally, a company that relies on the Safe Harbor for transfers of 
personal data should cease its transfers while waiting for the Safe Harbor 
2.0. However, for most businesses this is not an option. For transfers of 
personal data during the grace period, David Frydlinger, partner at Swedish 
law firm Lindahl advise companies to obtain an inventory of their transfers 
of personal data to the U.S.299 This allows companies to analyze under 
which exception the data has been transferred. Consequently, this provides 
companies with an overview of their transfers as well as an opportunity to 
transfer the data under another exception than the Safe Harbor.300  
 
During the “grace period” transfers of personal data should be well 
documented.301 One option for companies is to create an internal policy 
document for transfers of personal data.302 The policy may constitute legal 
assessments of the invalidation of the Safe Harbor regarding transfers of 
personal data. Moreover, the policy may provide obligations of 
documentation for the company’s transfers of personal data regarding the 
exceptions under which each transfer is made. In any case, no new 
agreements for data transfers should be entered into that relies on the Safe 
Harbor.303 
 
                                                
296 In the Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled and 
Maintained by Microsoft Corporation, 15 F.Supp.3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
297 United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Microsoft Corporation v. Unites 
States of America, Case number 14-2985.  
298 GDPR, at recital 90 and art. 43a. 
299 David Frydlinger, partner at Lindahl, Frukostseminarium med Advokatfirman Lindahl 
om Safe Harbor-domen, 23 October 2015, http://www.lindahl.se/se/om-oss/senaste-
nytt/seminarier/2015/frukostseminarium-om-safe-harbor-domen/.  
300 Id. 
301 Id. 
302 Interview with Karl-Hugo Engdahl, Legal Counsel at Klarna AB, 4 December 2015. 
303 Id. 
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6 Analysis 
The previous chapters have described as well as briefly analyzed how the 
“digital” privacy protection has developed in the EU and the U.S. and has 
aimed to give the reader an understanding of why there is a discrepancy 
between the two privacy regimes. The reader has also been introduced to the 
solutions for the clashing privacy regimes and the lawful instrument for 
transfers of personal data that are available to EU and U.S. companies. In 
Section 1.2 the reader was presented with three questions that would satisfy 
this thesis objective of investigating how the differences between the EU 
and U.S. privacy protection will affect a Safe Harbor 2.0 in light of the 
Schrems ruling and the right to erasure of the GDPR. These comprised the 
following questions: 
 
• What are the impacts of the Schrems ruling for EU and U.S. 
companies engaging in transatlantic transfers of personal data? 
• Can the U.S., at all, ensure an adequate level of protection that is 
“essentially equivalent” to the EU privacy protection? 
• How will the discrepancy between the EU and the U.S. privacy 
protection affect a future Safe Harbor 2.0? 
 
In the following, I will answer these questions based on the findings in the 
research. 
6.1 Impacts of the Schrems Ruling 
This thesis has focused on the possibility for the Commission to make an 
adequacy decision under article 41 of the GDPR. The adequacy decision 
provides companies with a lawful instrument for transfers of personal data. 
In the Schrems ruling, the CJEU invalidated the current adequacy decision, 
i.e. the Safe Harbor, and layed down requisites, regarding the assessment of 
the third country’s privacy protection, that must be satisfied when making 
an adequacy decision. The requisites for making such decision will be 
discussed in the following Section 6.2.  
 
The invalidated Safe Harbor resulted in that EU and U.S. companies, 
engaging in transatlantic transfers of personal data, no longer have an 
attractive and simple instrument for such transfers. For now, companies 
transferring personal data across the Atlantic are left with few lawful 
instruments for transfers, awaiting the Safe Harbor 2.0. A “grace period” 
has been given, until the end of January 2016, to find alternative methods 
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for transfers of personal data before Member State DPAs are compelled to 
take all necessary and appropriate actions. This may include coordinated 
enforcement actions regarding the lawfulness of transfers. Additionally, the 
new provision of higher penalties in the GDPR, will most likely give 
companies an incentive to review the methods under which transfers of 
personal data are made. The obscure legal situation and the risk of higher 
penalties has placed an implicit burden of documentation on companies as 
legal advisors recommend them to (1) obtain an inventory over the transfers 
of personal data to the U.S.; (2) review under which exception the data is 
transferred; and (3) create an internal document, which states the 
assessments that have been made when transferring personal data to the U.S. 
However, it should be noted that all companies may not have the resources 
to ensure compliance or even resources to obtain legal advise. In these 
cases, I believe that it ultimately is the Member State DPAs that have a 
special responsibility to communicate the new changes to these companies.  
 
As a result of the Schrems ruling, Member State DPAs are not prevented 
from examining a claim concerning privacy rights merely because the 
Commission has adopted a decision under article 41 of the GDPR. The 
implication that follows from this is that the transparency and certainty that 
made the Safe Harbor attractive can be undermined by independent DPAs as 
they have the ultimate power to examine if a Safe Harbor 2.0, de facto, 
provides an adequate level of protection. In my opinion, a Safe Harbor 2.0 
must provide companies with transparency and certainty for their transfers 
of personal data. If companies cannot rely on a Safe Harbor 2.0 for 
transatlantic data transfers, article 41 of the GDPR will loose its character of 
being an attractive solution for cross-border transfers – a solution, which 
ultimately facilitates for transatlantic trade with regard to personal data. 
6.2 The Transatlantic Discrepancy: Can 
the U.S Ensure an “Essentially 
Equivalent” Level of Protection? 
The discrepancy between the two privacy regimes, the outcome in the 
Schrems case, and the proposed GDPR have made it unclear whether the 
U.S., at all, can ensure an adequate level of protection, i.e. an “essentially 
equivalent” level of protection to the EU privacy protection. The CJEU 
concluded, in the Schrems ruling, that it is the Commission’s responsibility 
to thoroughly examine the U.S. privacy protection and conclude whether or 
not an adequate level of protection can be ensured. Furthermore, the Court 
stated that when determining whether an adequate level of protection is 
offered by a third country, the assessment must be made by reason of the 
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third country’s domestic law or its international commitments. Additionally, 
an adequacy decision under article 41 of the GDPR require the Commission 
to consider, inter alia, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
relevant legislation, both general and sectorial including legislation that 
concerns national security, any data protection rules, professional rules and 
security measures, the access of public authorities to personal data, effective 
and enforceable rights, and the existence and effective functioning of one or 
more independent supervisory authorities, i.e. the FTC. The last two factors 
are more specifically discussed in Section 6.3. 
6.2.1 The U.S. Sectorial Privacy Legislation 
The EU has in its legislation acknowledged the fact that information easily 
can cross borders in today’s information techonology society. As a result, 
the right to privacy and personal data has been enshrined in important 
legislation that protects EU citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Moreover, such right was strengthened through the Directive, which 
acknowledged that because the processing of personal data was increasing 
in economic and social activity online, it was important that such data-
processing systems contributed to an individual’s well-being and respected 
its fundamental freedoms, i.e. the right to privacy. Contrary to the EU 
privacy legislation, the U.S. patchwork of privacy legislation results in 
fundamental deficiencies such as a lack of a unanimous definition for 
“personal data”. Additionally, the lack of a comprehensive privacy 
protection leaves U.S. citizens with torts as a cause of action for any 
privacy-based claims. This includes a “highly offensive” prong that must be 
satisfied in order to prevail in a privacy-based claim. The research has 
shown that in contrast to the EU privacy protection, the U.S. sectorial 
privacy legislation fails to provide its citizens with a unanimous 
comprehensive privacy protection. 
 
Furthermore, the right to privacy was later strengthened in Google v. AEPD. 
In this case, EU citizens were given a first right to be forgotten on the 
Internet with regard to search results based on his or her name. The CJEU 
imposed an obligation on search engines to remove personal data published 
by third parties relating to a person even when the publications originally 
were lawful. The rationale for the imposed obligation was that search 
engines’ list of results relating to a person provided easy access and played a 
decisive role in the dissemination of that information. According to the 
Court, this constituted significant interference with the data subject’s 
fundamental right to privacy. In contrast, Section 230 of the CDA provides 
websites with immunity for third party content and a website has no 
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obligation to remove such content even when the content is of a defamatory 
nature. 
 
The right to be forgotten in Google v. AEPD has now been extended to an 
express right to erasure in the GDPR. The GDPR modernizes the privacy 
principles set out in the Directive and focuses on “reinforcing individuals' 
rights, strengthening the EU internal market, ensuring stronger enforcement 
of the rules, streamlining international transfers of personal data and setting 
global data protection standards.” The reform will especially ensure the 
protection of individuals’ personal data when meeting the challenges of the 
borderless Internet. This EU privacy protection provides the framework for 
the assessment of an ”essentially equivalent” level of protection. Although 
the White House has released a proposal that will strengthen privacy rights 
that translate to the dynamic environment of the Internet, the strong 
protection of free speech is a key rationale for why a right to be forgotten 
has not been accepted in U.S. law. . In connection with the White House’s 
proposal, it has even been held that the right to be forgotten is an 
“impermissible antithetical”. Only in cases where the personal data belongs 
to a minor is it possible to notice an approximation between the two privacy 
regimes. In some specific cases, U.S. minors have a right to be forgotten 
with regard to juvenile offenses and the removal of content posted by the 
minors themselves. 
6.2.2 The Fight Against Terrorism 
One important issue is the possibility for U.S. authorities to access EU 
citizens’ personal data on a generalized basis under the Patriot Act, which 
may undermine the fundamental right to privacy. In the Schrems case, the 
CJEU clarified that the adequacy decision must contain findings of rules 
that do not interfere with EU citizens fundamental right to privacy or 
effective legal protection that prevent such interference. As U.S. authorities 
on a generalized basis can access records of personal data in accordance 
with the Patriot Act, the U.S. privacy protection can be undermined by the 
U.S.’ efforts to intercept and obstruct terrorism. In addition, the CJEU held 
that access to individuals’ personal data on a generalized basis could not be 
considered to respect the EU fundamental right to privacy and thus, not 
provide a protection that is “essentially equivalent” to the EU protection. 
Furthermore, article 41.2 of the GDPR specifically points out that the 
Commission is required to consider the possibility for a country’s 
authorities to access personal data. Consequently, the U.S. cannot be 
considered to satisfy an “essentially equivalent” level of protection if U.S. 
authorities continuously may access individuals’ personal data and process 
such data in a way incompatible with the original purpose. This especially, 
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when this is done beyond what was strictly necessary and proportionate to 
the protection of national security without any safeguards that would limit 
interference with the fundamental rights of EU citizens. Furthermore, there 
may be new U.S. legislation on its way offering the U.S. government, and 
U.S. companies, extensive protection for the sharing and monitoring of 
information under the proposed CISA. If the CISA becomes U.S. law, the 
issue will yet again concern the enforcement of EU citizens fundamental 
right to privacy. 
6.2.3 No Respect for the EU Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms 
The EU offers a strong privacy protection for its citizens. Not only is the 
notion of privacy regarded as a broad fundamental right but the CJEU has 
also given EU citizens a right to be forgotten on the Internet and new 
strengthened privacy legislation is on its way. However, as has been 
concluded in Section 4, the U.S. has a fundamentally different privacy 
protection, and it does not recognize the right to be forgotten, which is one 
of the key provisions in the GDPR. If the U.S. cannot recognize one of the 
EU’s key provisions of the privacy protection it offers to EU citizens, it can 
be questioned whether the U.S., at all, could ensure an adequate level of 
protection. In my opinion, the privacy protection of a third country is not 
sufficient when it can be questioned, which makes it even more important 
that EU citizens privacy rights are guaranteed in a Safe Harbor 2.0. 
 
Because the U.S. does not recognize the important provision “the right to 
erasure”, it is my opinion that the U.S. legislation fails to respect EU 
citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms. There is a U.S. legislation 
providing companies with immunity for third party postings and critique has 
been raised against the FTC for not properly enforcing compliance under the 
Safe Harbor. The Schrems court considered that the U.S. system did not 
provide any effective detection and supervision mechanism that identified 
and punished infringements of the Safe Harbor in practice. Because the FTC 
only can initiate legal proceedings against companies in order to prohibit 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices, it is my opinion that the U.S. fails to 
provide effective enforcement of privacy rights. This is true both with 
regard to effective and enforceable rights, and effective functioning of an 
independent supervisory authority. Based on the foregoing, the EU and the 
U.S. have many aspects to discuss before the U.S. can ensure an adequate 
level of protection that is “essentially equivalent” to the EU privacy 
protection. Although it is not reasonable that the EU should be able to 
dictate U.S. privacy policy, the principle of mutual recognition should apply 
in all situations where there is a discrepancy between two legal orders. Thus, 
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this thesis contends that the two privacy regimes must unite on a workable 
enforcement of EU citizens’ right to privacy in order to guarantee an 
“essentially equivalent” level of protection. 
6.3 The Safe Harbor 2.0 
A Safe Harbor 2.0 must be based on the Commission’s investigation 
concluding that the U.S. can ensure an adequate level of protection that is 
“essentially equivalent” to the EU privacy protection. Based on the 
conclusions made in Section 6.2, I contend that the U.S. privacy protection 
does not amount to a level that is “essentially equivalent” to the EU privacy 
protection. However, this fact should not result in a suspension of 
transatlantic transfers of personal data altogether. In the following, I will 
present consideration that, in my opinion, need to be addressed in a Safe 
Harbor 2.0 in light of the discrepancy between the privacy regimes, the 
Schrems ruling, and the proposed GDPR. 
6.3.1 Actionable Privacy Rights 
It is essential that the Safe Harbor 2.0 take into consideration the provisions 
set out in the proposed GDPR. The right to erasure is a fundamental right 
that most likely will not be compromised in the final version of the GDPR. 
Thus, the U.S. reluctance towards the right to be forgotten is an obstacle that 
has to be resolved in the EU-U.S. negotiations. EU citizens should be 
provided with minimum safeguards that reflect their right to erasure. This 
way, U.S. companies cannot circumvent and undermine EU privacy 
protection by making decisions based on U.S. privacy policies. As 
contended, with regard to the U.S. ability to provide a privacy protection 
that is “essentially equivalent”, the Safe Harbor 2.0 needs to provide EU 
citizens with a workable enforcement of their right to privacy.  
 
Transfers of personal data are key for transatlantic trade and given the 
discrepancy, it is obvious that compromises must be made. However, it 
should be a reasonable demand that EU citizens’ fundamental right to 
privacy is not lost just because it crosses the Atlantic. Just as companies 
targeting U.S. citizens are expected to adhere to U.S. statutes, it is 
reasonable to demand that U.S. companies do the same. Most importantly, it 
is reasonable to demand that the U.S. government respects EU privacy law 
in this regard. Additionally, if the CISA becomes U.S. law, it should not be 
accepted that companies that comply with the program are effectively 
immune from all legal claims. In this regard, the EU must ensure actionable 
privacy rights for its citizens. Although the interception and destruction of 
terrrorism is an important and current issue, the U.S. should not be allowed 
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to undermine EU citizens fundamental right to privacy on a generalized 
basis. Even though the CJEU more or less rejected that the U.S. privacy 
protection amounted to an adequate level of protection, the EU is unlikely to 
be able to influence any U.S. legislation that has as its purpose to counteract 
terrorism. As the CJEU held in the Schrems case, any EU legislation 
protecting fundamental rights and freedoms must lay down clear and precise 
rules governing the scope and application of measures and impose minimum 
safeguards. This is necessary in order to provide EU citizens with sufficient 
guarantees for effective protection of their personal data against the risk and 
abuse and against any unlawful access and use for their data. This 
requirement has been met by the new article 43a of the GDPR. Nonetheless, 
a Safe Harbor 2.0 should also include a provision that addresses if and how 
U.S. courts may order a U.S. company to produce documents containing EU 
citizens personal data which are being stored abroad, i.e. in another 
jurisdiction. Needless to say, there may be situations where U.S. courts must 
be able to order access to personal data that U.S. companies store abroad 
when relevant to a specific case. However, it is unreasonable that U.S. 
courts extend its jurisdiction in a way that compromises EU citizens 
fundamental right to privacy. Hence, sufficient guarantees for effective 
protection are important when negotiating the Safe Harbor 2.0. A realistic 
Safe Harbor 2.0 provides EU citizens with efficient judicial remedies, i.e. 
actionable privacy rights, and should unconspicuously state the legal 
remedies EU citizens can pursue against both companies that unlawfully 
transfer personal data to the U.S. and U.S. governmental bodies that 
unlawfully access such data. 
6.3.2 Self-Regulation and Workable 
Enforcement 
EU privacy concerns show that self-regulation is an issue as U.S. companies 
can change and exercise their businesses in accordance with U.S. policies. 
In the Schrems case, the Court noted that self-certification in itself is not 
contrary to the requirement that a third country must ensure an adequate 
level of protection. However, the reliability of the U.S. system was 
questioned, as U.S. public authorities had no obligation to comply with the 
Safe Harbor. Just as the invalidated Safe Harbor, there is a risk that self-
regulation cannot be properly enforced to ensure the right to privacy. In the 
end there is a risk that U.S. companies process EU citizens’ personal data on 
the basis of U.S. legislation and policies. For example, article 17 of the 
GDPR provides an exception under which a data controller is not obligated 
to erase data subject to a takedown request. Consequently, a U.S. company 
has discretion to determine if the data can be retained in accordance with 
article 17.3 of the GDPR. Therefore, when determining whether or not such 
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obligation exists, there may be a risk that a U.S. company will make its 
decision based on U.S. policies and not EU law. Given that the U.S. 
legislator does not recognize a right to be forgotten it can be questioned 
whether a U.S. company will adhere to the broad EU privacy legislation. 
This leaves EU citizens’ fundamental right to privacy in the hands of U.S. 
companies. Can Europeans reasonable expect or even demand that U.S. 
companies adhere to EU privacy law? As the U.S. privacy protection 
fundamentally differs from the EU view on privacy, it is also questionable 
whether a U.S. court will consider an alleged violation of privacy rights on 
the basis of the EU privacy protection when assessing the facts before the 
court. The Microsoft case further disputes U.S. courts willingness to adhere 
to the EU privacy standards. Additionally, the invalidated Safe Harbor 
decision did not only allow for companies to self-certify to the Principles, 
but also stated that in cases where U.S. law imposes a conflicting obligation, 
U.S. law precedes over the principles pursuant to the Safe Harbor. In the 
Schrems case, the Court considered this to result in that U.S. organizations, 
receiving personal data from the EU, were bound to disregard the Principles 
without limitation whenever the Principles were in conflict with U.S. law. 
Consequently, a Safe Harbor 2.0 must lay down clear and precise rules 
limiting the situations in which a U.S. company can disregard the principles 
of a Safe Harbor 2.0.  
 
Furthermore, one issue is that the FTC only can initiate actions against 
companies in order to prohibit unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 
However, the EU’s right to erasure is unconditional of an unfair or a 
deceptive act. The right of EU citizens can be exercised given that one of 
the grounds under article 17 of the GDPR applies to the specific situation. 
Hence, if a U.S. company provides its privacy policy in a transparent 
manner describing how personal data belonging to a user is processed and 
transferred, the FTC will not have jurisdiction to initiate any legal claims. In 
these situations, the individual’s right to privacy cannot be properly 
enforced. That is why it is even more important that a Safe Harbor 2.0 
provide EU citizens with actionable privacy rights. Earlier efforts to make 
the Safe Harbor truly safe have consisted of solutions for handling non-
compliance among U.S. companies that misrepresented their compliance 
with the Safe Harbor. Additionally, the FTC has been criticized for not 
monitoring compliance efficiently. The risk of non-compliance and non-
efficient monitoring will be difficult to completely eliminate. However, 
regardless the importance of the obstruction and interception of terrorism, 
the U.S. government or U.S. companies, EU citizens should at least have the 
possibility to initiate legal claims regarding their privacy rights.  
 60 
6.4 Conclusion 
The emergence of Big Data, the discrepancy between the EU and the U.S. 
privacy protection, the Schrems ruling, and the proposed GDPR have 
resulted in challenges for both legislators and companies with regard to 
transatlantic transfers of personal data. I contend in this thesis that the U.S. 
legal order does not amount to a protection that is “essentially equivalent” to 
the EU privacy protection. However, as the discprepancy cannot result in a 
suspension of transatlantic transfers of personal data, a reasonable 
compromise is that EU citizens should be provided with actionable privacy 
rights and a workable enforcement in a Safe Harbor 2.0. In my opinion, EU 
citizens’ fundamental right to privacy is an offline right that, regardless 
whether or not the data cross borders, should also apply online. Lastly, when 
awaiting the final version of the Safe Harbor 2.0, it is important to have in 
mind that politics is just as much involved as law. The two privacy regimes 
clearly have different approaches to privacy protection and neither regime is 
likely to want its privacy protection dictated by another legislator. 
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